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INTRODUCTION

Over the last four decades, end-of-life law has had a life, so to
speak, of its own. Through court decisions and statutes, state laws
specify the medical conditions in which someone may refuse lifeprolonging measures, the persons who can make refusal decisions
when the patient lacks capacity, and the standards by which those
decisions will be judged acceptable.' Some states have passed special
laws requiring physicians to inform their patients of end-of-life
options when the patient has a terminal condition.2 The federal
government has also been involved in end-of-life law: since 1990,
hospitals that receive Medicare or Medicaid funding have been
required to ask patients whether they have advance directives and to
inform them of any hospital policies that would prevent their
implementation.' Early versions of the Affordable Care Act 4
1. For a comprehensive explanation of the law of end-of-life decision making, see
generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING (3d ed. 2004) (looseleaf text updated annually)
(providing a broad overview of statutory and case law surrounding end-of-life decision
making).
2. To date, four states have passed such laws: California, Michigan, New York, and
Vermont. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (West Supp. 2014); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 333.5654-.5655 (West Supp. 2012); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c
(McKinney Supp. 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1871 (Supp. 2012). Violation of the New
York statute can result in monetary fines and even imprisonment. See Questions and
Answers About Palliative Care, Hospice, and the Palliative Care Information Act, N.Y. ST.
DEP'T HEALTH, http://www.health.ny.gov/professionals/patients/patient rights/palliative
care/practitioners/questions andanswers.htm#q_25 (last visited Jan. 30, 2014). See
generally Sonia M. Suter, The Politics of Information: Informed Consent in Abortion and
End-of-Life Decision Making, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2013) (discussing and critiquing
these statutes).
3. Patient Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388,
1388-115, 1388-204 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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promised more-physician reimbursement for advance care planning
with Medicare beneficiaries.s The entire health insurance reform
effort floundered and nearly failed when Sarah Palin charged that the
reimbursement provision would empower "death panels" to ration
life-sustaining treatment and deny care to the elderly and disabled; it
was eliminated before the Act's final passage. 6 Distortion and fearmongering are not new to end-of-life law. Since the 1970s, this area of
law has been a hotbed of controversy-from early cases brought by
families to allow their permanently unconscious or dying relatives to
be removed from ventilators,7 to later cases involving patients in
similar conditions but a different form of life support (artificial
nutrition and hydration'), to the now increasingly common case in
which it is health care providers, not families, who are insisting it is
time to let the patient die.'
Today we have multiple complex legal rules that treat decisions
about medical treatment at the end of life differently than other
important decisions about medical treatment. Many of the special
rules for end-of-life decision making insist on legally exact and
increasingly complex documentation; depend on idealized, unrealistic
4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
5. H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 1233 (2009), available at https://www.govtrack.us
/congress/bills/111/hr3200/text (text as of Oct 14, 2009).
6. See generally Brendan Nyhan, Why the "Death Panel" Myth Wouldn't Die:
Misinformation in the Health Care Reform Debate, 8 FORUM 1, 1 (2010) (tracing the origin
and spread of the "death panel myth").
7. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (N.J. 1976) (holding that patients, such
as Karen Ann Quinlan, who was in a permanent vegetative state, have a federal
constitutional right to refuse extraordinary treatment and allowing her family to render
their best judgment about what she would want done). Death and dying jurisprudence
actually predates Quinlan, but Quinlan was a landmark decision. See generally Norman L.
Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudenceof Death and
Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182 (2001) (explaining that some courts relied on a
constitutional right, others a common law right, and some both, in uniformly establishing
that competent patients have a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment).
8. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990) (upholding
Missouri's prohibition against removing artificial nutrition and hydration unless there was
clear and convincing evidence that this was what Nancy Cruzan-who was in a permanent
vegetative state-would have wanted, based on her own statements to that effect).
9. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Surrogate Selection: An Increasingly Viable, but
Limited, Solution to IntractableFutility Disputes, 3 ST. LOuIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
183, 204 (2010) ("Futility disputes are regularly identified as the single biggest ethical
dilemma facing North American hospitals."); see also Ruth A. Mickelsen et al., The
Barnes Case: Taking Difficult Futility Cases Public,41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 374, 374 (2013)
(describing dispute between a health care agent and a hospital over the "futility" of
continued aggressive medical treatment for a patient); infra Part II.A (discussing the
Hanford Pinette case).
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notions of patient autonomy; and are driven by political ideology
rather than concern for patients."o There is little evidence that such
rules produce good and some evidence that they produce harm,
impeding rather than honoring patients' wishes, values, interests, and
relationships."
How we got here is understandable. The early cases had no
precedent, and courts struggled to develop constitutional and
common law standards to address the new controversies brought
about by medical advances that could save and extend life.12 State
legislatures responded by developing "safe harbor" statutes that
would let patients, families, physicians, and hospitals know when
forgoing life-sustaining treatment was legally acceptable, and allow
these matters to be decided outside the traumatic and contentious
arena of the courtroom."
But the time has come to abandon this way of thinking-to put
an end to end-of-life law-and there is good evidence that a necessary
shift is already underway. This Article argues that questions about
medical care at the end of life should be approached like other
important questions about medical care-with consideration to
patients' wishes, values, interests, and relationships, and without
special laws, special burdens of proof, or unique requirements for
documentation. Reducing legal distinctions between end-of-life
decisions and other health care decisions can bring efficacious
changes to both sorts of decision making processes. On the one hand,
we can import good legal and ethical practices in caring for patients
generally to caring for them when they are dying. At the same time,
we can bring important lessons learned from decades of end-of-life
law and ethics to the care of patients at any stage of life and health.
Before charting this course, a word about terminology is in order.
This Article will use the terms "life-prolonging measures," "lifesustaining treatment," and similar terms interchangeably, as well as
10. See infra Part II and notes 34-41 and accompanying text.

11. See infra Part II and notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
12. See generally WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE DEATHS OF NANCY
CRUZAN (2002) (detailing the legal landscape and advocacy surrounding the Cruzan
case); Cantor, supra note 7 (providing an overview of end-of-life law after Quinlan);
Annette E. Clark, The Right to Die: The Broken Road from Quinlan to Schiavo, 37 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 385 (2006) (reviewing landmark end-of-life court decisions).
13. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-1-2(g)(8) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (immunity for
appointed proxy); id. § 22-8A-7(c) (LexisNexis 2006) (immunity for health care providers);
id. § 22-8A-1(h) (LexisNexis 2006) (immunity for surrogate decision maker from statutory
default list). See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at § 7.10[E] & [F],
§§ 8.01, 8.09, 11.11[B] (providing an overview of statutory immunity for health care
providers and surrogate decision makers).
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"surrogate decision maker," "proxy," or "health care agent," and
"living will" or "instructional advance directive." State laws define
and use these terms with some precision, but they do not always share
meanings across states. Most of the times that these terms are used in
the Article, they are not used to make a point about a particular
statutory meaning; when they are, care is taken to indicate that.
Part I provides a brief overview of the current law of end-of-life
decision making. Part II then discusses, in some detail, two stories
that reveal some of the many problems the current legal approach
engenders. Part III explains why end-of-life decisions should be
treated like other important medical decisions. Part IV provides a
blueprint for reform through eight general principles that should
guide the law relating to all health care decisions, including those we
now think of as end-of-life decisions.
I. THE LAY OF THE LAND

Much of the special legal environment surrounding what we
think of as end-of-life decisions focuses on narrow conceptions of the
fundamental obligations we owe one another. This is in large part
because the law has developed through recognition of patients' rights
rather than provider, family, or societal responsibilities. In the
language of constitutional law, these are framed as rights to selfdetermination, bodily integrity, and life." In the context of health
care decisions, these rights are more likely to be described as respect
for patients' autonomy and protection of patients' best interests.

Respect for patients' autonomy is given great weight, or at least
that is what many legal decisions intend to do, and some may actually
achieve that goal. When an individual has decision-making capacity,
her right to refuse medical treatment is nearly absolute, even if
14. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)
(determining that prior cases support a constitutional liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment based on notions of bodily integrity); Conservatorship of Wendland v.
Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 166-75 (Cal. 2001) (discussing conscious conservatee's right to
life); In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. 1996) (basing right to refuse treatment on the
individual's right to self-determination). But see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
725 (1997) (rejecting a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide and emphasizing
that the right assumed in Cruzan was not based on abstract concepts of personal
autonomy); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 (M.D. Fla.
2005) (rejecting Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim of a "right to
life"), affd, 403 F.3d 1289, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005).
15. See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP AND JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (7th ed. 2013) (discussing the now-standard approach for analyzing
ethical questions in medicine through the four principles of respect for autonomy,
beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice).
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treatment is relatively non-invasive, most likely curative, and forgoing
it would jeopardize the patient's health or even lead to death.' 6 Why
competent patients" might wish to refuse treatment does not
ultimately matter-they do not have to justify their health care
decisions on the basis of religious beliefs, moral convictions, or
anything of the sort."8 For patients with decision-making capacity, the
law governing decisions about life-sustaining treatment is no different
than the law governing other medical decisions-deference to the
patient's desires is almost complete. 9
16. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that a woman with disabilities was allowed to refuse a feeding tube in the
hospital); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 652 (Ga. 1989) (holding that a man with
quadriplegia had the right to be removed from ventilator); Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d
1232, 1235-36 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that a competent woman could refuse
amputation of her gangrenous leg); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 624 (Nev. 1990)
(holding that a man with quadriplegia had the right to withdrawal of respirator). As
Norman Cantor explains in his history of death and dying jurisprudence, "courts have
uniformly upheld an adult's prerogative to reject a blood transfusion." Cantor, supra note
7, at 194 n.7 (citing Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990); Pub. Health Trust v.
Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989)).
17. This Article will sometimes use the terms "competent" or "incompetent" to
reflect a patient's capacity to make important medical decisions. Many of the court
decisions use these terms. Principle 7, however, emphasizes the importance of carefully
determining and monitoring capacity and allowing patients to make, or be involved in, as
many decisions as they can. See infra Part IV.G.
18. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (determining that Bouvia's decision to forgo
medical treatment "is a moral and philosophical decision that, being a competent adult, is
[hers] alone"). But see Paul K. Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social
Prejudice,3 ISSUES L. & MED. 141, 158 (1987) (critically reviewing the Bouvia opinion
from a disability rights perspective and pointing out that, despite the court's insistence that
the decision was Bouvia's alone to make, the court assessed for itself the quality of
Bouvia's life and determined that it was not worth living).
19. One condition in which competent patients do not receive complete respect for
their autonomous decisions is pregnancy. See Julie D. Cantor, Court-Ordered Care-A
Complicationof Pregnancy to Avoid, 366 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2237, 2237 (2012) (discussing
case of Samantha Burton, a pregnant Florida woman subject to a court order to follow
doctor's orders for hospitalization and, ultimately, a cesarean section). For an example in
the end-of-life context, see In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reversing trial
court order of cesarean section for terminally ill woman of uncertain capacity over the
objections of family). The appellate court in In re A. C. held that the trial court should
have expressly determined the patient's competency. Id. It left open the possibility that
even if a patient is found to be competent, there may be "extremely rare and truly
exceptional" cases in which the patient's decisions about medical treatment may be
overridden. Id. See generally April L. Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant
Women Who Refuse Medical Treatment, 69 TENN. L. REV. 563, 564 (2002) (explaining that
"the overwhelming sense among medical, legal, and ethics scholars is that judicial action is
inappropriate and unwarranted" to compel pregnant women to undergo particular
medical treatments). State intrusions into the decision making-medical or otherwise-of
pregnant women appear to be on the rise. See generally R. Alta Charo, Physiciansand the
(Woman's) Body Politic, 370 NEw ENG. J. MED. 193 (2014) (criticizing legislatures'
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To what extent we must respect the autonomy of patients
without decision-making capacity, however, is not as straightforward.
Generally, respect for the autonomy of patients who previously had,
but have now lost, capacity is understood as respect for their prior
decisions-whether these were fully formed expressed preferences
(as in, "if I am ever in a persistent vegetative state, I would not wish
to have my life prolonged by a feeding tube") or were instead a series
of choices made in the course of their pre-incapacity lives from which
we draw conclusions about what they would have decided if faced
with the exact question now considered.2 0 The law does not generally
promote respect for autonomy as including respect for choices that
benefit others' interests over the patient's interests, even if a
competent patient could freely make such decisions.21 In this way,
intrusions into the practice of medicine, especially involving pregnant women); Lynn M.
Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the
United States, 1973-2005: Implications for Women's Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 299 (2013) (reporting and analyzing 413 cases). Another
limitation on the fulfillment of competent patients' medical decisions is posed by
conscience clause legislation that allows health care providers to refuse to honor patient or
surrogate directives if they conflict with the provider's religious or moral beliefs. See
Howard Brody et al., Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: The Evolution of Ethics,
Evidence, and Policy, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1053, 1055-56 (2011) (discussing such
clauses in the context of patients' options to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration).
20. See Alan Meisel, Suppose the Schindlers Had Won the Schiavo Case, 61 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 733, 744-45 (2007) (describing the substituted judgment standard, which was
adopted in Quinlan and has become the predominant standard). According to Meisel,
"Put most simply, the substituted judgment standard seeks to determine the nowincompetent patient's probable wishes concerning treatment." Id.; see also PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMED. AND

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 132
(1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N] ("The substituted judgment standard requires
that a surrogate attempt to reach the decision that the incapacitated person would make if
he or she were able to choose.").
21. It is true that there is some indication in several court opinions that, in determining
what the incompetent person's choice would be, it may be appropriate to consider the
impact of the decision on the patient's family. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("[S]ince most people are concerned about the wellbeing of their loved ones, the surrogate may take into account the impact of the decision
on those people closest to the patient." (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 20, at
134-35)); In re R.H., 622 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (noting that in
determining what an incompetent patient's choice would be, a judge should consider,
among other things, "the impact on the patient's family"). However, in neither of those
cases was the primary determinant of the substituted judgment decision the patient's
putative regard for the interests of others. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1,
§ 4.03[B] (citing In re Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1269 n.15 (Mass. 1992)) ("Even those courts
that consider a broad array of factors under the aegis of the substituted judgment standard
are unwilling, at least overtly, to consider the financial cost of the care."); see also
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND
THE SOCIAL SELF (CATRIONA MACKENZIE & NATALIE STOLJAR, eds., 2000) (collection
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autonomy is de-contextualized or de-relationalized. So, for example,
it would be unusual to see a living will that explicitly directed that
life-sustaining treatment be either discontinued or continued for the
benefit of another (as in, "if I am ever in a persistent vegetative state,
I would like my husband to choose what to do on the basis of what is
best for our children"). Such language is far removed from the typical
language of living wills. 22 Even if that statement were written into a
personalized living will, a court would likely be flummoxed to know
what to do with it.23
The law also looks to protect an incompetent patient's best
interests. But in the context of decisions about life-sustaining
treatment, continued life, if it is possible, is almost always seen to be
objectively in a person's best interests. While it is possible to hear
people make assessments that death is preferable to some forms of
living-where suffering is intense and pleasure absent, and both of
these permanently so-this is seldom the position taken by the law.24
Instead, continued life, if it is possible, is almost always seen to be
presumptively in a person's best interests.2 It is true that in some
of essays on contemporary feminist theory that offer accounts of autonomy that are
"relational" and that recognize individuals as socially interdependent); Sue Campbell,
Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self
(Review), 17 HYPATIA 165, 165 (2002) (describing this volume as offering "accounts of
autonomy capable of recognizing and supporting commitments to others").
22. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.303 (West 2010) (suggesting a standard form for
living wills); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.4 (West Supp. 2013) (same).
23. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
24. For a related line of jurisprudence, see the "wrongful life" cases, in which a child
born ill or disabled claims that he or she would not have been born (and thus suffered
injury) but for the negligence of the defendant health care provider in failing to properly
advise the child's parents of the risk of disability or illness before the child's birth. Only
three jurisdictions have recognized such claims; the majority of jurisdictions have rejected
them, generally determining that, as a matter of law, life with an illness or disability is
better than never having been born at all. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal.
1982) (accepting the "wrongful life" cause of action); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760
(N.J. 1984) (same); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 488 (Wash. 1983) (same).
But see Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1123 (Md. 2002) (rejecting claim and reviewing
twenty-year history of wrongful birth and wrongful life claims). See generally Mark
Strasser, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Death, and the Right to Refuse
Treatment: Can Reasonable JurisdictionsRecognize All But One?, 64 MO. L. REV. 29, 6467 (1999) (comparing wrongful life, wrongful birth, wrongful death, and treatment
refusal-sometimes called "wrongful living"-claims).
25. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway v. Cmty. Convelscent Ctr., 549 N.E.2d 292, 299
(Ill. 1989) ("The problem with the best-interests test is that it lets another make a
determination of a patient's quality of life, thereby undermining the foundation of selfdetermination and inviolability of the person upon which the right to refuse medical
treatment stands .... While not passing on the viability of the best-interests theory in
Illinois, we decline to adopt it in this case because we believe the record demonstrates the
relevancy of the substituted-judgment theory."); In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d
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states (but not all) life support may be withdrawn on the basis of a
person's best interests, 26 but the discretion to do so is not as broad as
it might first appear. The standard has generally been found to be
inapplicable to patients in a permanent vegetative state (since they
cannot experience any burdens from continued treatment or life), 27
and is often available only when the person's medical condition is
such that, no matter what interventions are pursued, he or she is
going to die fairly shortly anyway and attempting to extend life would
severely impair its quality.
Due to the presumption that continued life is nearly always in a
person's best interests, the structure of much of the law relating to
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment begins with a
default position in favor of continued life. State statutes grant
immunity to providers and surrogate decision makers who make
decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment only
under certain circumstances. 28 Generally, the patient must be
terminally ill (some of the statutes require that death be "imminent")
60, 75 (Wis. 1992) ("[T]he presumption is that continued life is in the best interests of the
ward, and the burden rests upon the guardian to show ... that the decision to withhold or
withdraw treatment is in the ward's best interests and was made in good faith."); MEISEL
& CERMINARA, supra note 1, § 4.07[B] (noting that some courts have accepted the best
interests standard for decisions about life-sustaining treatment, although only a few have
applied it, and that some have rejected it).
26. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, § 8.08 (noting inconsistent statutory
support for the best interests standard); id. § 4.07[B] (discussing variability among courts
about the permissibility of using the best interests standard).
27. See, e.g., DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 705 (Ky. 1993) (stating that the best
interests analysis would not be adopted); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 759 (Md. 1993) ("A
best interest test applied to . .. any patient who is in a persistent vegetative state, who is
not in pain, and who is not terminally ill, requires this Court to make a quality-of-life
judgment under judicially adopted standards, without legislative guidelines."); In re M.
Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 425 (N.J. 1987) ("[A] benefits-burden analysis ... is essentially
impossible with patients in a persistent vegetative state."); see also 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 162,
189-90 (1988) ("The balancing of costs and benefits to the patient that a surrogate must
undertake for a terminally ill patient cannot be done in the same way for a patient who is
permanently unconscious.").
28. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-1-2(g)(8) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (immunity for
appointed proxy); id. § 22-8A-7(c) (LexisNexis 2006) (immunity for health care providers);
id. § 22-8A-1(h) (immunity for surrogate decision maker from statutory default list); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 765.305 (West 2010) (providing circumstances under which life-prolonging
procedures can be withheld or withdrawn in the absence of a living will); id. § 765.109
(providing immunity for health care providers, surrogates, and proxies for actions taken in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter 765). The structure of these statutes as
immunity statutes does not mean that life-sustaining treatment cannot be withheld or
withdrawn outside of these conditions, and many of them contain a "savings" provision
that explicitly provides that the common law and constitutional rights of the patient are
preserved. See Cantor, supra note 7, at 190; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.106
(preservation of existing rights).
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or permanently unconscious." Some states, like Florida and
Maryland, permit life-sustaining treatment to also be withheld or
withdrawn when the patient is in an "end-stage condition," like endstage renal disease or advanced dementia." Only a few, like Virginia,
do not restrict authority for forgoing life-sustaining treatment to any
particular medical condition."
Generally, surrogate decision makers must base their decision on
the expressed preferences of the patient first, then on the patient's
values through a "substituted judgment" process.32 As noted above, if
there is no information of this kind upon which to base a decision to
forgo life-sustaining treatment, surrogates in some states can make a
decision on the basis of the patient's best interests, although this is by
far the less preferred option." Written instructions (such as a living
will) are generally privileged over oral instructions, and both are
strongly preferred over a mere understanding of a person's values. A
few states have required clearly expressed (written or oral)
preferences about withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment in a situation like the one the patient is in and eschew
decisions made on a more generalized understanding of a patient's

29. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805(a) (Supp. 2012) (granting
immunity where patient has a terminal condition or is in a persistent vegetative state);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2133.08(A)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (granting immunity where

patient has a terminal condition or is in a permanently unconscious state). These
conditions are usually those that are also specified as conditions under which a patient's
living will, or instructional directive, would be operative.
30. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.303 (suggesting a standard form for living wills); id.
§ 765.305 (stating that, in the absence of a written advance directive, a surrogate may only
exercise an incompetent patient's right to forgo treatment when "[t]he patient has an endstage condition, the patient is in a persistent vegetative state, or the patient's physical
condition is terminal"). An "end-stage condition" is "an irreversible condition that is
caused by injury, disease, or illness which has resulted in progressively severe and
permanent deterioration, and which, to a reasonable degree of medical probability,
treatment of the condition would be ineffective." Id. § 765.101(4). This term is commonly
understood to embrace advanced dementia, such as that caused by Alzheimer's, which is
steadily progressive, incurable, and ultimately fatal. See 85 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 318, 328
(2000) (interpreting a statute similar to Florida's).
31. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2981 to -2993 (2013).
32. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
33. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, § 8.08 (noting inconsistent statutory
support for best interests standard); id. §4.07[B] (discussing variability among courts
about the permissibility of using the best interests standard); see also Kim Dayton,
Standards for Health Care Decision-Making: Legal and Practical Considerations, 2012

UTAH L. REV. 1329, 1343 (arguing that even if guardianship statutes explicitly require a
best interests standard, this must be understood in light of court decisions establishing
constitutional rights and therefore be interpreted to require substituted judgment, if
feasible).
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values.34 In some states, written authorization by the patient is
required to forgo artificial nutrition and hydration, at least for some
conditions."
Finally, in many states, the evidence supporting the surrogate's
decision must be "clear and convincing." 6 This is an intermediate
standard of evidentiary proof, higher than the usual standard for civil
34. See Alan Meisel, Lois Snyder & Timothy Quill, Seven Legal Barriers to End of
Life Care:Myths, Realities, and Grains of Truth, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2495, 2497 (2000)
(explaining that at that time, New York, Missouri, Michigan, and Wisconsin required
evidence of an incompetent patient's actual wish to forego treatment under some
circumstances). New York's law has since been revised by passage of the Family Health
Care Decisions Act in 2010. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2994-a to -u (McKinney 2012).
Missouri may also have backed away from its strict requirement of prior patient
expressions in case law subsequent to Cruzan. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1,
§ 4.06[A]. The standard requiring actual prior expressions by the patient is sometimes
called the "subjective standard" in contrast to the substituted judgment standard. See
Meisel, supra note 20, at 745 (explaining that "[t]his standard requires knowledge of the
patient's actual wishes about treatment rather than the substituted judgment standard's
determination of probable wishes").
35. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3206(H) (Supp. 2012) (creating rebuttable
presumption that a permanently unconscious patient has directed that medically supplied
nutrition and hydration continue unless the patient's instructional directive instructs
otherwise or other narrow exceptions apply); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.631, 311.629
(LexisNexis 2011) (allowing surrogate decision makers to authorize the forgoing of
artificial nutrition and hydration only if the patient's death is expected within a few days
or if the patient is permanently unconscious and has executed an advance directive
authorizing its withholding or withdrawal, or artificial nutrition and hydration cannot be
physically assimilated or its burdens outweigh its benefits); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.509(6) (2012) (stating that in the absence of a patient's health care directive specifying the
withholding or withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, either or both may be
withheld or withdrawn if the attending physician determines "the nutrition or hydration
cannot be physically assimilated by the principal or would be physically harmful or would
cause unreasonable physical pain to the principal"); see also discussion infra Part II.B
(discussing North Carolina law). See generally Brody et al., supra note 19, at 1056 (noting
that "[p]atients' options to refuse ANH [artificial nutrition and hydration] may ... be
restricted by laws either directly prohibiting such refusals or allowing health care facilities
to refuse to honor the refusals"-the latter referring to "conscience clauses" in many state
statutes that allow health care providers to refuse to honor patient or surrogate directives
if they conflict with the provider's religious or moral beliefs).
36. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, § 3.27[A] (" 'Clear and convincing
evidence' . .. has become the clearly dominant accepted standard of proof in end-of-life
cases. Clearly, it applies in court cases; it similarly appears that this standard of proof is to
be used in nonjudicial review of end-of-life decisionmaking." (citations omitted)); see also,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(3) (West 2010) (specifying the "clear and convincing"
evidence standard for default surrogates); In re Guardianship of M. Browning, 568 So. 2d
4, 16 (Fla. 1990) (suggesting that the "clear and convincing" standard would apply equally
to health care agents whether the agents are appointed or determined by statutory
hierarchy, although this is not entirely clear); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981)
(determining that "[c]lear and convincing proof should also be required in cases where it is
claimed that a person, now incompetent, left instructions to terminate life sustaining
procedures when there is no hope of recovery").
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cases of "preponderance of the evidence" and lower than the criminal
law standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." 7 This means that the
surrogate who wishes to refuse treatment must be able to substantiate
his or her decision, while those who wish to begin or continue lifesustaining treatment do not.38 The clear and convincing evidence
standard contributed to Nancy Cruzan's parents' loss in the 1990
Supreme Court decision considering their request to discontinue
artificial nutrition and hydration for their daughter, who was
permanently unconscious." The evidence offered in the lower court
hearing did not satisfy Missouri's requirement that a patient in
Cruzan's condition have previously expressed a wish to discontinue
treatment. 40 The majority upheld Missouri's strict standard that such
preferences be proven by clear and convincing evidence of past
expressions on the grounds that it is better to err on the side of life.41
The combination of these many requirements and the
complexities involved in meeting them can result in decisions that do
not adequately honor or protect a patient's preferences and interests,
especially when decisions are made about life-sustaining treatment
for patients lacking capacity.

37. The majority opinion in Cruzan noted that clear and convincing evidence was that
which
produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth
of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty
and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285 n.11 (1990) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. How meaningful this evidentiary standard is in practice is unknown, as the vast
majority of these decisions are made outside of court review. See Clark, supra note 12, at
404 ("At present, there is an enormous disconnect between the kind of evidence courts
require to authorize withdrawal of treatment and what is happening every day at patients'
bedsides when the family and health care providers are in agreement that life-sustaining
procedures should be discontinued. Should we be concerned about parallel decisionmaking systems, one administered by the courts and the other administered in private at
the hospital or nursing home bedside?").
39. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 283 ("We believe that Missouri may permissibly place an increased risk
of an erroneous decision on those seeking to terminate an incompetent individual's lifesustaining treatment.").
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II. EVEN IF YOU Do EVERYTHING RIGHT, THE LAW IS STILL A
PROBLEM

There are a number of statutes and court decisions that could be
used to illustrate how our special rules for end-of-life contexts can
prevent or corrupt good, reasonable, and well-intentioned decision
making and that we would be better off treating medical decisions at
the end of life like we treat medical decisions generally.42 But the two
stories chosen for this Part are uniquely well-suited to the task
because the individuals involved were doing or had done everything
right by the standards of end-of-life law: they were on top of things,
educated about their options, and trying to act responsibly.
The first story involves a problematic case decision while the
second involves a problematic statute. The first illustration is a case in
which the treatment may have been withdrawn earlier than it should
have been and the second when the law might require treatment
when it is not wanted. Thus, the "errors" can go in either direction.
A.

The Pinettes

In 2004, seventy-three-year-old Hanford ("Hank") Pinette was
hospitalized for congestive heart failure and sustained by life support
systems as his respiratory, circulatory, and renal systems failed. 43 Six
years earlier, Mr. Pinette had appointed his wife as his health care
agent and had executed a living will." When he was admitted to the
hospital, his wife presented both documents to hospital personnel 45 an action long urged by health care advocates but often neglected by
patients and families.4 6
At some point during his admission, doctors at the hospital
believed Mr. Pinette's condition had reached the point where life42. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing statutes imposing special
restrictions on removing artificial nutrition and hydration) and notes 238-40 and
accompanying text (discussing case of Sheila Pouliot).
43. Lois SHEPHERD, IF THAT EVER HAPPENS TO ME: MAKING LIFE AND DEATH
DECISIONS AFTER TERRI SCHIAVO 117-20 (2009) [hereinafter SHEPHERD, IF THAT
EVER HAPPENS TO ME]; Lois Shepherd, Shattering the Neutral Surrogate Myth in End-ofLife Decisionmaking: Terri Schiavo and Her Family, 35 CuMB. L. REV. 575, 585-87 (2005)
[hereinafter Shepherd, Shatteringthe Myth].
44. Shepherd, Shatteringthe Myth, supra note 43, at 585-86.
45. Anthony Colarossi, Hospital, Wife Battle Over Patient'sLife: A Hearingin Orange
Will Consider the Fate of a Clermont Man Who Has a Living Will, BIOETHICS.NET (Nov.
19, 2004), http://www.bioethics.net/2004/11/a-more-dramatic-case-than-schiavo-majorstory/.
46. See Barbara A. Noah, In Denial: The Role of Law in Preparingfor Death, 21
ELDER L.J. 1, 11 (2013).
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prolonging procedures were only artificially prolonging the process of
dying and that he should be allowed to "die naturally," as stated in his
living will.4 7 They certified that Mr. Pinette was in a terminal
condition and unresponsive, and sought Alice Pinette's permission to
remove life support.4 Ms. Pinette, however, believed that her
husband was still alert, that he would squeeze her hand in recognition
of her company, and that he enjoyed watching sports on television
with other family members.49 When an agreement on life support
could not be reached, the director of risk management for the
hospital sought a court order to allow the hospital to remove it on the
basis of the living will."
The Florida statutes were silent about how to resolve an
apparent conflict between a living will and a duly-appointed health
care agent's decision.' Nor had the Florida courts previously
addressed the question. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court for
Orange County determined that the living will dictated that treatment
be discontinued and authorized the hospital to withdraw it against the
wishes of Mr. Pinette's wife and health care agent."
Although a newspaper photo of a crumpled and weary Alice
Pinette revealed some of the personal toil of the court's decision, the
case appeared to be a triumph for those who have championed the
living will as an instrument for choice and control in the dying
process. After years of reports that people do not execute living wills
in high percentages (less than twenty percent of Americans have
one"), that they are difficult to apply,54 and that they are routinely
47. Colarossi, supranote 45.
48. Id.
49. Id.; Shepherd, Shatteringthe Myth, supra note 43, at 586.
50. Order Granting Petitioner the Right and Authority to Comply with the Wishes
and Living Will of Hanford L. Pinette, In re Hanford L. Pinette, No. 48-2004-MH-1519-O,
at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 23, 2004), available at http://mckinneylaw.iu.edu
/instructors/orentlicher/healthlw/Pinette.htm [hereinafter Pinette Order].
51. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.303 (West 2010).
52. Pinette Order,supra note 50, at 1.
53. According to a recent report by the National Center for Health Statistics,
estimates of complete advanced directives among adults in the United States have ranged
from 5% to 15%. ADRIENNE L. JONES, ABIGAIL J. MOSS & LAUREN D. HARRISKOGETIN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., USE OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN

LONG-TERM CARE POPULATIONS 5 (2011). Use of advance directives among adults in
long-term care populations is much higher: "28% of home health care patients, 65% of
nursing home residents, and 88% of discharged hospice care patients had at least one
advance directive." Id. at 1 (including "do not resuscitate orders" as an advance directive
in the study).
54. See Lesley S. Castillo et al., Lost in Translation:The Unintended Consequences of
Advance Directive Law on ClinicalCare, 154 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 121, 121-28 (2011)
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ignored"-here was a case in which a living will had been signed and
delivered, seemed fairly straightforward to apply, and hospital
officials and health care providers, rather than ignoring the living will,
were insisting that it be followed. The president of Aging with
Dignity, a Florida-based national organization that advises people
about the benefits of living wills, indicated that the lesson to be
learned from the controversy was that family members may not make
the best health care proxies because of their emotional involvement.56
Indeed, the judge's own order stated that "[t]his case emphasizes the
need for people to sign Living Wills expressing their last wishes."s"
But these conclusions are only persuasive if it is clear that
honoring the living will to its letter respected Mr. Pinette's autonomy.
The facts raise strong doubt about that conclusion. His concurrent
appointment of Ms. Pinette as his proxy gave her full decision-making
authority." Which did he intend to carry the most weight? A number
of studies have concluded that many people want their health care
agents to take their "instructions" in living wills as "suggestions"and to have leeway to respond as they think appropriate in the
situation that comes to pass.59 Mr. and Ms. Pinette had been married
(noting the difficulty physicians, patients, and families have shown in understanding the
meaning of ambiguous terms such as "terminal" or "irreversible"); Rebecca Dresser,
Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEx. L. REV.
1823, 1829-37 (2003) ("[M]ost of the directives that are completed fail to convey
meaningful information."); Angela Fagerlin & Carl Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the
Living Will, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-April 2004, at 30, 30-42 (offering a thorough
critique of living wills and arguing that it is a mistake to believe that better forms are the
answer); Susan E. Hickman et al., Hope for the Future: Achieving the OriginalIntent of
Advance Directives, HASTINGS CENTER REP. (SPECIAL REP.), Nov.-Dec., at S26, S26-S30
(detailing many of the often-repeated criticisms of traditional advance directives, including
vagueness, lack of understanding, and a legalistic focus on refusing unwanted treatment
rather than patient goals of clinical care); John A. Robertson, Second Thoughts on Living
Wills, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 6, 6-7 (questioning the guidance living
wills can offer).
55. Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 54, at 32-33; see also Noah, supra note 46, at 11
(noting that advance directives "are frequently inaccessible at key decision-making points,
irrelevant or insufficiently specific to address the actual medical decision at hand,
overruled by family members, or ignored by health care providers").
56. See Colarossi,supra note 45.
57. Pinette Order,supra note 50, at 1.
58. While a copy of the durable power of attorney, like the living will, is not readily
available, Colarossi reported that "[tihe power of attorney states her husband assigned her
'to decide for me [Hanford Pinette] any matters regarding my health care, including, but
not limited to, consenting to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures.'"
Colarossi, supra note 45.
59. See, e.g., Brenna Kelly, Annette Rid & David Wendler, Systematic Review:
Individuals' Goals for Surrogate Decision Making, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 884, 892
(2012).
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for at least fifty years.' She appeared devoted to him and committed
to making decisions in his best interests."1 Neither the court order nor
the newspaper accounts of the hearing suggested that he was in pain
or otherwise suffering.62
Moreover, the living will form he had signed could hardly be
thought to have been specifically tailored to his individualized
preferences. The news reports present a conflated view of Mr.
Pinette's living will. For example, the use of language like "[Mr.]
Pinette stated" 63 suggests that he had written a personalized living
will, when in fact all of the language quoted suggests that the living
will followed exactly the words of the Florida statutory living will
form.' That form does not contain a menu of options. 65 Like many of
the first generation forms (of which many are today still in use as
state-endorsed forms), the only instruction available was to end life
support.66
Given these facts, it is reasonable to believe that Mr. Pinette
would have preferred his wife to make this decision rather than have
a court enforce the boilerplate conditions of his living will over her
objection. Indeed, as is common, he may have executed the living will
in an attempt to add further protection of his wife's decision-making
power (providing her with documentary evidence to support
treatment refusal if needed) rather than as a limitation upon it. If this
is true, it is sadly ironic that, rather than the document helping her to
avoid a legal battle, it caused her to become embroiled in one. In
addition, advocates for advance directives commonly urge people to
execute them in order to relieve loved ones of the burden of making
these life and death decisions.6 ' But here, as interpreted by the
60. Colarossi, supranote 45.
61. See id.
62. Pinette Order,supra note 50, at 1; Colarossi, supra note 45; Hospital, Patient'sWife
in Right-to-Die Dispute, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Nov. 20, 2004), http://www.sptimes.com
/2004/11/20/State/Hospital-patient s w.shtml.
63. See Hospital,Patient's Wife in Right-to-Die Dispute, supra note 62.
64. FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 765.303

(West 2010).

65. See id.
66. See id. (suggested form of living will). For an example of a recently revised
statutory form that contains more options, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(dl) (2013).
67. See, e.g., Advance Directives and Living Wills, VANDERBILT-INGRAHM CANCER
CENTER, http://www.vicc.org/cancercare/advanced/directives.php

(last visited Jan. 26,

2014) ("[P]atients should keep in mind that avoiding these decisions when they are well
will only place a heavier burden on them and their loved ones later on."); Your Advance
Directive, COMPASSION & CHOICES, http://www.compassionandchoices.org/what-wedo/advance-planning/advance-directive/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) ("Increase your own
peace of mind and provide it to your family members by explaining what healthcare you
would prefer if severely injured or terminally ill."). The evidence about the effect of
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hospital and the court, the living will added an extra burden on his
wife, even if Mr. Pinette's intention was to do the opposite.
About ten years ago, during a conference on end-of-life law, a
physician confessed that although he had executed a living will to
permit removal of life support in certain circumstances, he had
deliberately chosen not to follow the popular advice of having it
placed in one's medical record, or otherwise having it readily
available. Instead, he kept it locked up in a safety deposit box. It was
there if his wife needed it to support the decision that she felt was
best to make, but he was taking care that it would not otherwise land
in the hands of doctors or hospital administrators who might try to
use it to convince her to make a decision they wanted. It is
noteworthy that this admission came from a physician. Another
physician, a colleague of mine, once similarly explained, in a matterof-fact manner, that she had not signed a Durable Do Not Resuscitate
Order' for her frail, incapacitated, and declining mother because the
doctors would think it meant "Do Not Treat." Physicians and
hospitals are not disinterested participants in these situations, even if
we assume they are well-informed and well-intentioned. Significantly,
one of the articles reporting on the Pinette case proclaimed that "[a]n
Orlando hospital won the right Tuesday to honor Hanford Pinette's
living will ... ."69 It makes one wonder: who did Hanford Pinette's

right to self-determination belong to, anyway?

advance directives or knowledge of patient preferences on surrogates' emotional burden
in making end-of-life treatment decisions is mixed. David Wendler & Annette Rid,
Systematic Review: The Effect on Surrogates of Making Treatment Decisions for Others,
155 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 336, 343 (2011). According to a recent review article, two

quantitative studies found that surrogate stress was substantially lower when an advance
directive specified the patient's treatment preferences, although four other studies
concluded that
having confidence in their knowledge of the patient's treatment preferences did
not ease the burden for at least some surrogates. In addition, fourteen studies
reported that surrogates experienced more negative emotional burden when the
treatment that was thought to be in the patient's best interests differed from the
treatment that ... was what the patient would want.
Id.
68. In general, a Durable Do Not Resuscitate Order is an out-of-facility physician's
order that prevents emergency personnel from administering cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation efforts in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2987.1 (2013) (defining a Durable Do Not Resuscitate Order).
69. Anthony Colarossi, Living-Will Ruling Means Man Can Die, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Nov. 24, 2004), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2004-11-24/news/0411240296
.1-pinette-alice-lucerne-hospital.
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If our legal treatment of end-of-life decisions were more in line
with our legal treatment of medical decisions generally, some
flexibility and latitude would be possible. We would not be as ready
to assume that a form document signed years before in a state of
relative health can definitively answer what an ill and dying patient
would want now if he or she could tell us. We would understand that
patient autonomy is usually paramount, but that how to honor it is
often not obvious, and that forms tell only part of a story. We would
also better appreciate that patient autonomy is not the only thing that
matters. In this case, a law originally designed to keep end-of-life
decision making outside the courtroom did the opposite. The law
created a special conflict-between forms and persons, between
husband and wife-that would not have existed otherwise.
B.

The U.C. Book Club
The second illustration involves recent revisions to the North
Carolina statutes governing the appointment of health care agents
and living wills. I became aware of these revisions when I was invited
a few years ago to speak about the Terri Schiavo case70 to a women's
book club in North Carolina (the U.C. Book Club of Gaston County).
Anticipating that members of the club-all of whom were over
seventy-five-years-old-would have questions about advance care
planning, I reviewed the North Carolina statutes to see what I might
be able to tell them and found-despite recent revisions in 2007 7 -a
number of problems that might encumber their own advance care
planning and perhaps eventually their own care. The revisions appear
70. See generally SHEPHERD, IF THAT EVER HAPPENS TO ME, supra note 43
(describing the controversy surrounding the 2005 removal of artificial nutrition and
hydration from Terri Schiavo, a Florida woman in a permanent vegetative state, which
involved many years and more than one legal case).
71. Act of Aug. 30, 2007, ch. 502, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1532 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (2013)). Prior to the revisions, North Carolina's Living Will
Statute, adopted in 1977, allowed treatment withdrawal for patients whose medical
condition was either: (1) "[t]erminal and incurable," or (2) "[d]iagnosed as [in] a persistent
vegetative state." Id. § 90-321(b)(1), repealed by Act of Aug. 30, 2007, § 11(b), 2007 N.C.
Sess. Laws at 1545. By contrast, North Carolina's Health Care Power of Attorney Statute,
adopted in 1991, allowed individuals to authorize health care agents to withhold or
withdraw treatment when the patient was terminally ill, was permanently in a coma,
suffered severe dementia, or was in a persistent vegetative state. Id. § 32A-25(3)(G),
repealed by Act of Aug. 30, 2007, § 6(a), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1536. The revisions were
intended to align these two advance care planning mechanisms to apply to the same
medical conditions. See Dorothy D. Nachman, Living Wills: Is It Time to Pull the Plug?, 18
ELDER L.J. 289, 319-21 (2011). Under the previous versions of the statutes, it was not
clear whether an individual who had not appointed a health care agent could forego lifeprolonging measures in a condition of severe dementia. See id. at 320.
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to have been well-intended.72 They were aimed at clearing up some
problematic inconsistencies and uncertainties in the statutes. For
example, they allowed individuals to indicate for themselves whether
a health care agent's decisions or a living will should trump when
there is a conflict (the Pinette type situation just discussed). 74 And
they expanded and clarified the conditions that might be specified in
an advance directive for allowing the withdrawal or withholding of
life-prolonging measures.7 5
The women in the book club, like Hanford Pinette, were taking
care to fulfill their responsibilities through advance care planning, as
urged for many years by countless health care and advocacy
organizations and media. When I asked for a show of hands, most had
advance directives. The possibility of eventually suffering from
advanced dementia was on the minds of many of the women I spoke
with that day. They had seen it; they had cared or were still caring for
relatives with it. They knew about the possibility of placing feeding
tubes in elderly individuals with advanced dementia; some of them
had, in fact, conceded to the recommendations of health care
providers to authorize it for the individuals for whom they now
served as surrogate decision makers. Some of them had witnessed
the agitation and suffering such feeding tubes can sometimes bring to
72. See Nachman, supra note 71, at 317-20, 324-325.
73. See id. at 319-21.
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(dl). See generally Kenneth L. Burgess, North Carolina
General Assembly Overhauls Advance Directives Laws, N.C. MED. Soc'Y, http://www
.ncmedsoc.org/non.members/publicresources/genassembly-overhauls-endoflife.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 28, 2014) (explaining revisions).
75. See § 90-321(dl) (allowing individuals to specify in a living will that they wish to
avoid life-prolonging measures if in a condition of advanced dementia). "Life-prolonging
measures" in the revised statutes means
[m]edical procedures or interventions which in the judgment of the attending
physician would serve only to postpone artificially the moment of death by
sustaining, restoring, or supplanting a vital function, including mechanical
ventilation, dialysis, antibiotics, artificial nutrition and hydration, and similar
forms of treatment. Life-prolonging measures do not include care necessary to
provide comfort or to alleviate pain.
Id. § 32A-16(4) (2013); see also id. § 90-321(a)(2a) (providing that life-prolonging
measures are defined in G.S. 32A-16(4)).
76. See generally Feeding Tubes in Advanced Dementia Position Statement, J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC'Y (May 2013), http://www.americangeriatrics.org/files/documents
/feeding.tubes.advanced.dementia.pdf (recommending against percutaneous feeding of
older adults with advanced dementia and recommending hand feeding instead). According
to the Position Statement, "[a]s many as 34% of US nursing home residents with advanced
dementia have feeding tubes, two-thirds of which are inserted during an acute hospital
stay. Caregivers report little conversation surrounding tube feeding decisions, and at times
families feel pressure for its use." Id. (citations omitted).
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these patients." A number of them clearly knew they did not want a
feeding tube if they ever had advanced dementia.
But what could I tell them? Bad news: documents that they had
drawn up just a few years before may not protect them against this
possibility. While a living will in North Carolina could now specify the
refusal of life-prolonging measures in a condition of advanced
dementia," it was not clear that such measures, including a feeding
tube, could be avoided without such a special declaration." In other
words, an individual might not be protected against this possibility if
she had a proxy appointment that did not specifically mention the
agent's powers in the situation of advanced dementia or if she had an
earlier generation living will that did not specify advanced dementia
as a condition in which life-prolonging measures could be withheld
because the law did not provide for that possibility before 2007.80
These women's now out-of-date documents had required two
witnesses who could not be related to them and notarization." The
forms had likely been provided by lawyers. They would need to go
through the entire process again.
Worse than these uncertainties, however, was the certainty that if
person
did not have an advance directive, but was relying instead on
a
the statutory hierarchy for surrogate decision makers (knowing for
example, that one's daughters would serve as decision makers by
77. See generally Muriel R. Gillick, Rethinking the Role of Tube Feeding in Patients
with Advanced Dementia, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 206 (2000) (discussing the overuse of
feeding tubes in patients with advanced dementia, as well as the potential for harm and
lack of benefit to their use).
78. § 90-321(dl).
79. See id. In the absence of an advance directive of any kind, the issue of whether
artificial nutrition and hydration could be avoided would be determined by section 90-322,
which does not include the condition of advanced dementia as one in which lifeprolonging measures can be withheld or withdrawn. If instead a proxy appointment has
been executed, but it does not grant authority for the proxy to withhold or withdraw lifeprolonging measures in the condition of advanced dementia, then, again, no express
authority would exist for this action. See id. § 32A-19(d) ("The powers and authority
granted to the health care agent pursuant to a health care power of attorney shall be
limited to the matters addressed in it, and, except as necessary to exercise such powers and
authority relating to health care, shall not confer any power or authority with respect to
the property or financial affairs of the principal."). Individuals, of course, have
constitutional rights to refuse treatment which may be invoked, but with uncertain
application here.
80. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
81. § 32A-16(3), § 90-321(c)(2), (3). See generally Castillo et al., supra note 54, at 123
(discussing negative consequences of execution requirements; noting that "nearly all states
require 2 witnesses to make advance directives legally valid, with 18 states permitting
notarization as an alternative"; and stating that North Carolina and West Virginia require
both).
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default and being satisfied with that default position), then there was
little to no protection against the imposition of a feeding tube in the
condition of advanced dementia even if the individual would not want
it and her daughters knew that.' The daughters would be heeded
only if doctors and hospitals would be willing to go outside the "safe
harbor" of immunity created by the North Carolina statutes.83
It is easy to think the answer to these problems can be found in
laws that are more carefully drafted and take more care in specifying
how things should be done. But North Carolina had just gone through
that exercise.' And as a country, we have been revising end-of-life
statutes for years, making them more comprehensive and more
detailed-and along the way revising advance directive forms until
they are ten pages long and barely understandable." The answers to
these difficult questions are not to be found in better forms (although
better forms are better than worse forms) or other unrealistic quests
to discover the Holy Grail for respecting patient autonomy.
It is also worth noting that end-of-life statutes provide a ready
tableau for some state politicians to advance pro-life agendas. After
the Terri Schiavo case, when special attention was focused on the
82. See § 90-322 (setting out the circumstances under which physicians may withhold
or discontinue life-prolonging measures in the absence of a living will or health care power
of attorney). The attending physician may follow the direction of an appropriate surrogate
decision maker (from a statutory list) to withhold or discontinue life-prolonging measures
"[i]f the attending physician determines, to a high degree of medical certainty, that a
person lacks capacity to make or communicate health care decisions and the person will
never regain that capacity," and that the person "has as an incurable or irreversible
condition that will result in the person's death within a relatively short period of time; or
... [i]s unconscious and, to a high degree of medical certainty, will never regain
consciousness." Id. § 90-322(a)(la).
83. See id. § 90-322(d).
84. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
85. See Nachman, supra note 71, at 324 ("Despite the legislature's articulated goal of
rendering the self-determination statutes more user-friendly and accessible, the new North
Carolina law has created so many individual options and elections that one seeking to
exercise his or her right to self-determination should do so with a caveat patiens
approach."). Kenneth Burgess, a North Carolina attorney, in an online explanation of the
2007 revisions, noted that "[a]lthough these additional choices promote patient choice,
they also have the potential to increase confusion and result in patients selecting mutually
inconsistent choices. Patients will need additional guidance with the new forms." Burgess,
supra note 74. For examples of other states' forms, see Advance Directives, WIS. DEP'T OF
HEALTH SERVS., http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/forms/advdirectives/ADFormsPOA.htm
(last visited March 14, 2014) (providing a nine page power of attorney document
(including instructions) and a four-page living will (including instructions)); Making
Health Care Decisions in North Dakota, N.D. DEP'T OF HUM. SERVS. (Nov. 2012),
http://www.nd.gov/dhs/info/pubs/docs/aging/aging-healthcare-directives-guide.pdf
(publishing a thirty-one page booklet for residents on advance health care directives,
including an eleven page advance directive form).
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issue of artificial nutrition and hydration, many states introduced bills
that would have essentially required patients to have a living will if
they wanted to refuse artificial nutrition."6 Otherwise, a feeding tube
would have been almost always required. What this would have
meant was a wholesale rejection of patient autonomy. While the large
majority of Americans do not have an advance directive, polls show
that they would not want artificial nutrition and hydration if they
were ever in a state of permanent unconsciousness. Fortunately,
nearly all of the bills failed, although some states do have laws that
create special hurdles for withholding or withdrawing artificial
nutrition and hydration." A number of statutory living will forms
allow individuals to express a preference for continuing artificial
nutrition and hydration while refusing all other forms of lifeprolonging measures,9 0 opening the dangerous and untenable
possibility that one might continue artificial nutrition and hydration
but refuse medically necessary dialysis to accommodate it.
86. See, e.g., Alabama Starvation and Dehydration of Persons with Disabilities
Prevention Act, H.B. 592, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2005) (modeled on National Right to Life
Committee's "model act" relating to artificially provided sustenance and hydration); H.B.
701, 107th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (same); S. 804, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (same);
H.B. 1577, 23d Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2005) (same); Iowa Starvation and Dehydration of
Persons with Disabilities Prevention Act, H. Study B. 302, 81st Gen. Assem., 1st Sess.
(Iowa 2005). See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, § 1A.03[C] (noting that
most of these bills failed); Brody et al., supra note 19 (discussing historical and current
landscape of law, ethics, and practice relating to medically supplied nutrition and
hydration); Joshua E. Perry, Biblical Biopolitics:JudicialProcess, Religious Rhetoric, Terri
Schiavo and Beyond, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 553, 623-27 (2006) (discussing Alabama's
proposal in particular, in the context of politicized religious advocacy); Lois Shepherd,
State Legislative Proposals Following Schiavo: What Are They Thinking?, 15 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTS. L. REV. 361 (2006) (critiquing the proposals and, in particular, the National
Right to Life Committee's Model Starvation and Dehydration of Persons with Disabilities
Prevention Act).
87. See Shepherd, supra note 86, at 373.
88. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 312 n.11 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] 1988 poll conducted by the Colorado University Graduate School of
Public Affairs showed that 85% of those questioned would not want to have their own
lives maintained with artificial nutrition and hydration if they became permanently
unconscious."); Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, Inc., SRBI/Time Magazine Poll # 20053500: Terri Schiavo, ROPER CENTER FOR PUB. OPINION RES. (Mar. 22-24, 2005),

http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/Catalog40/Catalog4O
.htx;start=summary_1ink?archno=USSRBI2005-3500 (indicating that 69% of Americans
"would. .. want [their] guardian to remove [their] feeding tube").
89. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, § 1A.03[C]; see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-3206 (Supp. 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.631, 311.629 (LexisNexis Supp.
2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-09(6) (2012).
90. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.4 (Supp. 2013) (providing Oklahoma's
statutory advance directive). Even the relatively liberal Uniform Health Care Decisions
Act, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 124-30, offers this possibility.
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Even North Carolina's revisions, billed generally as moderate
changes to create consistency and clear up uncertainty in existing
statutes, faced strong opposition from Life Tree, a pro-life Christian
organization." Life Tree opposed, among other things, the addition of
advanced dementia as a triggering condition for operation of a living
will, although North Carolinians had, for years, been permitted
through health care powers of attorney to authorize agents to make
decisions to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging measures in the
case of severe dementia.'
Some conservatives tend to see every statutory clarification of
rights that individuals almost certainly already possess-such as the
right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration in a condition of
advanced dementia-as governmental efforts to encourage
vulnerable, disabled, or elderly individuals to hasten their deaths.93
This is nonsense. But so is the common liberal response, which is to
think that as long as the powjr exists for educated people to protect
themselves, the law is adequate. A quick internet search will pull up
hundreds of websites explaining how a person can protect his or her
rights and interests through advance care planning documents, with
the more socially attuned sites adding information about the
importance of having "conversations" about these documents.94 But it
is not easy to find any mainstream websites about how to navigate
successfully the medical and legal labyrinth to protect a loved one's
rights and interests when those documents have not been executed or,
if executed, provide little guidance.
Instead of further attention on better forms and more detailed
legal rules, the focus needs to turn toward allowing people not to
engage in end-of-life advance care planning,95 yet still permit medical
decisions to be made that appropriately respect and care for patients.
91. Nachman, supra note 71, at 321-22.
92. Id. (describing the opposition the bill faced during its voyage through the North
Carolina Senate and House). For a summary of Life Tree's objections to the revisions, see
Elizabeth D. Wickham, North Carolina Advance Directives Bill Is Not Pro-Life, LIFE
TREE (Apr. 29, 2007), http://www.lifetree.org/newsletter/04_07.html.
93. See Nachman, supra note 71, at 321-22; Wickham, supra note 92.
94. See, e.g., Advance Directives and Living Wills, supra note 67 ("A living will
protects the patient's rights and removes the burden for making decisions from family,
friends, and physicians."); Your Advance Directive, supra note 67 (urging completion of
advance care planning documents to "[i]ncrease your own peace of mind and provide it to
your family members by explaining what healthcare you would prefer if severely injured
or terminally ill").
95. See generally CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1998)
(challenging the prevailing bioethical assumption that individuals want to, and should,
assume the full burden of medical decision making for themselves).
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III. WHY "END-OF-LIFE" DECISIONS SHOULD BE TREATED LIKE
OTHER IMPORTANT MEDICAL DECISIONS
The current legal framework for end-of-life decisions rests on a
set of narrow assumptions that shape its form and limit its
effectiveness. Built in response to a particular set of legal cases from
the 1970s to 1990s, this legal framework envisions a certain kind of
problem and a point at which a certain kind of decision has to be
made.96 The situation envisioned is one in which a hospitalized patient
is no longer believed, by physicians, to be an appropriate candidate
for "curative" therapy. He or she is either permanently unconscious
or going to die soon, regardless of the medical interventions
attempted. The surrogate decision maker is asked what the patient
would want. If the patient has followed the urgings of the health care
community and media, he or she has prepared an advance directive,
which, if it follows the statutory living will form, most likely directs
that life-sustaining treatment be withheld or withdrawn if it would
only prolong the process of dying. If an instructional advance
directive (living will) is absent, then the surrogate decision maker is
asked what the patient would want. The surrogate decision maker is
generally expected to relate that the patient would not want to
continue living in his or her current burdened and hopeless
condition.97 Life support is then withdrawn, and the law provides
immunity to all involved for following that course. If, contrary to
expectations, the family wishes to continue treatment, then physicians
may either honor that decision, believing continued treatment is a
reasonable (or at least not unreasonable) choice because death is
going to occur shortly anyway, or, if they believe continuing
treatment is inappropriate, the physicians may begin to explore their
options for transfer of the patient or discontinuation of treatment on
the grounds of "futility"-a vague and problematic concept. 98 Except
96. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 434 (N.J. 1987) (holding that husband, as
surrogate decision maker, could decide that artificial nutrition and hydration be
withdrawn from wife, who was in a permanent vegetative state, following determination
by two independent physicians of her condition); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670-71 (N.J.
1976) (holding that patients such as Karen Ann Quinlan, who was in a permanent
vegetative state, have a federal constitutional right to refuse extraordinary treatment and
allowing her family to render their best judgment about what she would want done).
97. Cf Atul Gawande, Letting Go, NEW YORKER (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/08/02/100802fa-fact-gawande?currentPage=1
(describing the dying experience of patients in hospitals).
98. See generally Daniel K. Sokol, The Slipperinessof Futility, 338 BRIT. MED. J. 2222
(2009) (describing the subjective nature of the concept of futility and different
understanding of futility).
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in those situations when the patient has entered a potentially longterm vegetative state or the medical treatment at issue is artificial
nutrition and hydration-matters about which there is less likely to be
agreement-by the time physicians start to pay close attention to
advance directives and engage in careful conversation with surrogate
decision makers and family members about patient preferences, there
often is not much to decide.
At the same time, there are likely to have been many other
important decisions made before that time-decisions that are not
treated by the law with the same attention to patient preferences and
family input. Contrary to the paradigm situation described above, the
patient's prognosis is often not clear enough for a physician's
certification of terminal illness or permanent unconsciousness.99
Rather than one decision that must be made-to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment-there are many, and those
decisions must frequently be revisited as the patient's condition
evolves or physicians obtain more clarity about it.
A final pair of assumptions is that patients have defined
preferences about the decision to be made and that family members
know them. Both of these assumptions are unlikely to be true, given
the potential variability in, and likely uncertainty about, the patient's
condition at different points in time when various potential treatment
options are considered.1 0o
The decision by President Obama's grandmother to have a hip
replacement reflects the broader context in which important medical
care decisions such as these are made, decisions which can have
permanent or life-ending consequences. In the fall of 2008, Madelyn
Dunham, who was eighty-six years old, underwent hip replacement

99. See Joseph J. Fins, Rethinking Disorders of Consciousness: New Research and Its
Implications, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-April 2005, at 22, 22; Gawande, supra note
97.
100. See Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 771 (Md. 1993) (Chasanow, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe inquiry at issue is not factual. It is an attempt to predict a
choice that cannot be made."). There are a number of studies that reveal the poor
predictive ability of potential surrogate decision makers, such as family members, to
choose the same treatment decisions as the relative for whom they may be asked to make
choices. See generally David I. Shalowitz, Elizabeth Garrett-Mayer & David Wendler, The
Accuracy of Surrogate Decision-Makers: A Systemic Review, 166 ARCH. INTERN. MED.
493 (2006) (reviewing studies that present patients and likely surrogates with hypothetical
scenarios involving decisions about life-sustaining treatment and concluding that, on
average, predictions by the surrogates were incorrect in one-third of cases and accuracy
did not differ between patient-designated and next-of-kin surrogates or when prior
discussions of treatment preferences had taken place).
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surgery after a fall had caused a hip fracture. 01 At the time of the
surgery, doctors predicted that she had less than a year to livepossibly less than three months-because of terminal cancer.'" The
idea appeared to be that the new hip would improve the quality of
her remaining life, and therefore be worth the discomfort and risk of
surgery posed by her heart condition and cancer. Instead, she died
two weeks afterwards as a result of the surgery.103 If the operation had
been successful, Ms. Dunham may have been able to attend her
grandson's inauguration; as it happened, she died one day before his
election.'" President Obama related the story in an interview as a way
to begin a dialogue about the allocation of health care resources.10
He said that, had the surgery not been covered by insurance, he
would have paid for it himself, but that the situation did raise the
question whether asking society to pay for such treatment is a
"sustainable model." 106 He added, "So that's where I think you just
get into some very difficult moral issues." 07
However, we do not need to get entangled in the controversial
issue of health care rationing to understand a decision like this one as
involving "some very difficult moral issues." As Joanne Kenen noted
in a commentary soon after the President's interview was published,
the more immediate and troubling questions concern the
appropriateness of care Ms. Dunham received, not its cost. 0 Were
less risky non-surgical options explored? Was the hip replacement
necessary for her comfort and quality of life? "And above all," wrote
Kenen, "was the care she got in keeping with her end-of-life goals and

her personal values?"10 9
The decision made in Ms. Dunham's case was not about
withdrawing or withholding life-prolonging measures. Yet it was just
as important as those decisions-with foreseeable consequences of a
permanent and irrevocable nature. It involved, as do many of the
decisions currently subject to special end-of-life rules, personal and
101. See Joanne Kenen, HEALTH CARE: Obama's Grandmother and the National
Conversation, NEW AM. FOUND. (May 1, 2009, 3:31 PM), http://www.newamerica.net
/blog/new-health-dialogue/2009/health-care-obamas-grandmother-and-nationalconversation-11479.
102. David Leonhardt, After the Great Recession, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 3, 2009, at
36, 76.
103. Kenen, supra note 101.
104. Id.
105. See Leonhardt, supra note 102, at 76.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Kenen, supranote 101.
109. Id.
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subjective value judgments about acceptable levels of pain and
disability, tolerance for risk, and whether life extension is more
important than quality of life or vice versa.
For all of these important health care decisions, there must be
established procedures and safeguards. The decisions should be made
with the utmost care and by the right people. 1 o The decision makers,
whether they are competent patients making decisions for
themselves, as Ms. Dunham was, or are surrogates making decisions
for others, must have access to all appropriate information. There are,
in other words, basic principles and best practices that should guide
how these decisions are made."' The law, however, should not
distinguish between such decisions simply because one set involves
patients who will die if certain treatment is forgone and the other
involves patients who may die if treatment is accepted. At the very
outset of the now nearly four decades of end-of-life law, the court in
In re Quinlan"2 noted that reasonable decisions of the very sort it was
called upon to approve were being made in hospitals with the
agreement of "responsible people involved in medical care, patients
and families" and with proper regard for patients."' The thick and
sometimes impenetrable end-of-life legal apparatus we have been
almost continuously building in the meantime now creates distortions
in that decision-making.
IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GUIDE LAw RELATING
TO HEALTH CARE DECISIONS.

The remainder of this Article identifies and discusses eight
general principles that should guide the law relating to health care
decisions. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, although its scope is
comprehensive. The principles listed are those that are likely to be
implicated in what we now think of as an end-of-life situation in
which end-of-life decisions are made, but they are principles that
110. See infra Part IV.B (Principle 2) (discussing rules and norms about surrogate
decision makers); see also discussion of the Pinette case supra Part II.A (arguing that the
decision to continue or discontinue life support measures for Hank Pinette should have
rested with his wife and appointed agent rather than on the interpretation of his living will
by the court, the hospital, and the hospital's risk management staff); infra text
accompanying notes 255-58 (discussing Texas law's "futility" statute, which allows
unilateral withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment by a Texas hospital over the objection of
family and health care agents).
111. See infra Part IV (identifying eight general principles to guide the law relating to
health care decisions).
112. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
113. Id. at 659.
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govern, or should govern, other important health care decisions.
Many of these principles, like much of end-of-life law, specifically
address the situation of the incapacitated patient, in which decisions
must be made on behalf of the patient by another. Patients who lack
capacity, whether they at one time possessed it or not, are vulnerable.
They need the law's protection. The principles described below do
not lessen the degree of protection the law affords to such patients.
Instead, the principles attempt to more clearly match the source of
perceived vulnerability with an appropriate legal mechanism to
provide protection against abuse, neglect, or disregard.
Nor do these principles lessen the degree to which we should
honor patients' rights to self-determination. The pre-incapacity
preferences of individuals, to the extent known, remain the most
important indicator of what should be done, but past expressions
should not crowd out every other consideration. For patients who
have never had capacity to make medical treatment decisions, the
principles acknowledge that there are still important questions about
their preferences and values, their degree of understanding, and
whether decision makers must secure the patient's assent to a course
of action or at least honor their expressions of protest.
A.

Principle 1: Respect and Carefor the PatientRequire Balancing
Rather Than Rigidly PrioritizingAmong PatientInstructions,
Wishes, Values, and Interests

This is the first, foundational principle to guide health care
decisions. The principles that follow it further specify how to put it
into operation.
All health care decisions, including decisions about withholding
or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, should be made on the basis
of respect and care for patients. Respect for patients includes more
than respect for patients' autonomy; it embraces the idea that patients
should be treated with respect for their equal human dignity, rather
than treated as objects, and that their privacy should be respected,
their confidences honored, and their relationships valued. "Care"
goes beyond a calculation of an individual's best interests, and
includes the notion of an attitude of care toward another and pays
attention to how medical care is delivered. This means, for example,
that when considering whether to tube feed a patient with advanced
dementia, it would be neither appropriate nor sufficient to conclude
that nutrition and hydration, even if artificially supplied, is always a
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form of "basic care" that must be supplied if doing so can extend
life.114 It would be necessary to consider how an individual person
would experience the provision of nutrition and hydration in this
manner-for example, whether it would cause discomfort or
agitation."'
As discussed above, the current legal framework for end-of-life
decision making gives great weight to a patient's preferences,
especially those expressed in writing.' Often, however, people have
not expressed in writing or even in clear oral statements what they
would like in a particular medical situation. There are a lot of good
reasons for this. People may not be able to anticipate the medical
condition they will later find themselves in, or know what they would
want done in that situation."' They may rather trust family members
to make medical decisions for them when the time for those decisions
arrives."s Respecting patients includes respecting their choice not to
specify their medical treatment preferences in advance. It also means
approaching standardized living will forms with less assurance that
they provide answers about what to do. People may sign such forms
because they believe they are required to in order to allow their loved
ones to make reasonable decisions in the future about their care (and,
as we saw with the North Carolina statute, they may be right). For
this and other reasons-for example, the limited options offered on
the forms, the use of terms not defined in the forms-these
documents' reflection of patient wishes may be weak.
When family members make other types of medical decisions for
loved ones-decisions that do not involve "life-sustaining
treatment"-they make decisions that they believe are in the best
interests of, and consonant with, the values of the patient. They take
into account the patient's expressed preferences as well, such as a vow
to refuse blood products on the basis of religious beliefs or other

114. During the controversy over the removal of Terri Schiavo's feeding tube, Pope
John Paul II issued an address that equated artificial nutrition and hydration of a person in
a permanent vegetative state with "basic health care" and stated that it should be
considered morally obligatory. The Vatican, Address to the Participants in the
International Congress: Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific
Advances and Ethics Dilemmas (Mar. 20, 2004). See generally Brody et al., supra note 19
(discussing the complex and evolving position of Catholic teaching on this subject).
115. See Gillick, supra note 77, at 207-08.
116. See supratext accompanying notes 32-35.
117. See supratext accompanying notes 82-83.
118. See, e.g., Joanne Lynn, Why I Don't Have a Living Will, 19 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
101, 103 (1991) ("I, and surely some other patients, prefer family choice over the
opportunity to make our own choices in advance.").
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clearly stated preferences or aversions,1 9 but often there are no such
expressions to take into account.
A patient's best interests may involve more than medical best
interests. For example, in Strunk v. Strunk,'120 a court determined that
it was in the best interests of an intellectually disabled man to donate
one of his kidneys to his brother because, absent another source of
donation, the brother would die and the man would suffer from the
loss of his brother's companionship.121
Although careful consideration of the best interests of the
patient is the norm for general medical decision making, in the case of
decisions about forgoing life-sustaining treatment, a patient's best
interests-or, to leave the legal language for a moment and be guided
by considerations of "care," how best to take care of and care for a
patient-isgiven much less weight.
There is a good historical explanation for this. In the early days
of end-of-life law, physicians were over-treating patients-insisting
that patients' lives be sustained notwithstanding how intrusive the
medical treatments might be, how ultimately unsuccessful they would
119. See Lisa J. Milligan & Mark C. Bellamy, Anaesthesia and Critical Care of
Jehovah's Witnesses, 4 CONTINUING EDUC. IN ANAESTHESIA, CRITICAL CARE & PAIN
35, 35 (2004).
120. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
121. Id. at 146 (affirming lower court's decision that "under the peculiar circumstances
of this case it would not only be beneficial to Tommy but also beneficial to Jerry because
Jerry was greatly dependent upon Tommy, emotionally and psychologically, and that his
well-being would be jeopardized more severely by the loss of his brother than by the
removal of a kidney"). But see In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Wis.
1975) (prohibiting a man who lacked capacity to be a kidney donor for a sibling with
whom he did not have a present relationship due to his mental illness because it would not
serve his interests). Note that some courts, including Strunk, have referred to "substituted
judgment" as the basis for making decisions for patients, such as Jerry Strunk, who have
always lacked decision-making capacity. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 148. Current understanding
of that standard, however, requires that decisions reflect the probable wishes of the
patient; accordingly, the substituted judgment standard is generally not understood as
appropriate for these patients, and the best interests standard is used instead. See Norman
L. Cantor, The Bane of Surrogate Decision-Making: Defining the Best Interests of NeverCompetent Persons, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 155, 158 (2005) ("[T]he bulk of commentators and
courts have rejected application of a substituted judgment standard-a standard seeking
to replicate the patient's own likely decision-in the context of a never-competent
person."). In fact, the court's reasoning in Strunk reveals that the best interests standard
was used, although the opinion references the substituted judgment standard. See id. at
160 (describing Strunk as using a best interests standard, as is typical of the few judicial
decisions purporting to use the substituted judgment standard for never-competent
patients, and stating that "the courts purporting to apply a substituted judgment standard
end up resolving the disabled patient's medical fate according to a projected weighing of
the patient's future pleasure and pain. In other words, they apply a best interests of the
patient standard").
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be in returning the patient to a condition of meaningful interaction
with the world, or how much they were unwanted by family members
speaking to what they believed their relative would want or benefit
from. 122 As courts began to recognize patients' rights to refuse
treatment, they gave primary and almost exclusive weight to patient
preferences in order to counter the paternalistic or vitalist tendencies
of health care providers that would otherwise routinely understand
continued life, in any condition, as being in the patient's best
interests." This emphasis on patient autonomy was also consistent
with broader movements toward recognition of individual rights
during this era.
Now that the law has firmly established that physicians cannot
dictate that aggressive measures are always in a patient's interests, it
is time to allow greater consideration of a more subjective,
individualized best interests calculation by surrogates, families, and
others involved in decision making. A strict ordering that grants the
highest level of deference to expressed (especially written)
preferences, mid-level deference to patient values, and the lowest
consideration to a patient's individualized best interests should be
abandoned in favor of allowing decisions to forgo or continue lifesustaining treatment to be justified on a reasonable combination of all
factors relevant to the patient. Proof, especially to the degree of
"clear and convincing evidence," of a now incapacitated patient's
wishes should not be required to forgo any particular kind of
treatment. Nor should the patient's medical condition have to fit
within any particular category.
This approach is reflected in the Uniform Health-Care Decisions
Act (the "UHCDA" or "Act"),124 which does not contain restrictions
122. See Robert Schwartz, End-of-Life Care:Doctors' Complaints and Legal Restraints,
53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1115, 1157 (2009) ("At least from the turn of the twentieth century
over a hundred years ago, American doctors have been enmeshed in a medical culture in
which death is the enemy and the preservation of life, in any form, constitutes a victory
over the enemy. American medicine was committed to using all of the resources available
to save lives.").
123. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 220
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding a man's right to have life support removed despite his
physicians' insistence on preserving it).
124. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS Act, 9 U.L.A. 83 (1993); see also Castillo et al.,
supra note 54, at 125-26 (arguing for reform "toward a flexible, relationship- and
communication-based model" to advance care planning that would include "improving the
readability of advance directives; eliminating surrogate restrictions; accepting oral and outof-state advance directives; eradicating witness and notary requirements; and encouraging
documentation of religious, cultural, and social beliefs"); Nachman, supra note 71, at 292
(discussing the shortcomings of instructional directives and arguing that "non-legally
binding forms should be used to help the patient articulate his or her desires at end of life
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on the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.125 The
Act, adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Law in 1993, serves as a model for this needed reform,
although to date it has only been adopted in six states.126 The Act
applies to all health care decisions, and not just those involving lifesustaining treatments.127 It allows health care agents, whether
appointed by a patient or granted authority through a default list of
family members and others close to a patient, to make all but a few
health care decisions for patients lacking capacity. 128 The Act requires
the agent to make health-care decisions in accordance with the
"principal's individual instructions, if any, and other wishes to the
extent known to the agent." 129 Otherwise, decisions should be made
"in accordance with the agent's determination of the principal's best
interest. In determining the principal's best interests, the agent shall
consider the principal's personal values to the extent known to the
agent."13 0
This approach is a sensible one if applied with the flexibility the
Act's language implies.131 Patient preferences, to the extent they can
while giving the primary legal right to make end-of-life decisions to the health care agent
and not a form, particularly when the patient is incapable of making coherent decisions").
125. See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS AcT, 9 U.L.A. 83. The Commentary for the
UHCDA states: "Although case law imposes limitations on the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment, attempts by the states to convert these limitations into
statutory language have met with little success. The Act does not attempt to duplicate this
failure." Why States Should Adopt the UHCDA, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%2OAdopt%
20UHCDA (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
126. According to the website of the Uniform Law Commission, as of November 22,
2013, UHCDA has been adopted in Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico, and
Wyoming. Legislative Fact Sheet - Health-CareDecisions Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=HealthCare%20Decisions%20Act (last visited Jan. 23, 2014). Other states' laws may be
influenced by the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN § 54.12981 (2013).
127. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS Acr, Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. at 84 (describing
the scope of the Act).
128. See id. These exceptions include decisions to commit an individual to a mental
health facility, which are often subject to state procedural safeguards. Id. § 13(e), 9 U.L.A.
at 125 ("This [Act] does not authorize an agent or surrogate to consent to the admission of
an individual to a mental health-care institution unless the individual's written advance
health-care directive expressly so provides." (alteration in original)); see infra Part IV.C
(Principle 3).
129. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2(e), 9 U.L.A. at 94.
130. Id.
131. According to the Act's Commentary, "[t]he term 'individual instruction' ...
includes any type of written or oral direction concerning health-care treatment." Id. § 1
cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 90. Thus, the Act does not appear to grant exclusive priority to living
wills.
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be determined, should continue to be given the greatest weight
among the various factors to be considered. Because this approach
does not limit withholding and withdrawing treatment to certain
medical conditions, patient preferences can in fact be given more
weight than they typically have been given in the past in many states.
At the same time, when patients' expressed preferences are general
or contradictory, agents can look to patients' interests and values to
understand and interpret them. Indeed, they should be encouraged to
do so, rather than to read more than is warranted into a form
document created by a state senate subcommittee or a years-old offhand remark. 32
It should be noted that there is a cost to recognizing how little
advance care planning documents or prior oral statements by the
patient often tell us about what a patient would want. The current
emphasis on advance care planning allows family members, surrogate
decision makers, health care providers, and even ethics consultants, to
believe that they are not making real-time decisions with life and
death consequences, but that these decisions were made by the
patient, perhaps long ago, and that they are merely the patient's
messenger.'3 3 But this is mostly a fiction. If the burden of these
decisions is made greater by recognizing that they are current, rather
than past decisions, made by people today, rather than others in the
past, then we need to work hard to figure out how to ease that
burden, but in honest ways.

132. See generally Robert A. Burt, The End of Autonomy, HASTINGS CENTER REP.
(SPECIAL REP.), Nov.-Dec. 2005, at S9, S9 (acknowledging the importance of protecting
patient autonomy in these and other medical decisions but also concluding that "the facts
are that applying the autonomy framework in end of life decision-making has had little
practical effect and much fictitious posturing").
133. This fiction is encouraged by online materials like those published by the Missouri
Attorney General's Office on the topic of advance care planning. Called "Life Choices,"
the publication begins: "Make important decisions now about your end-of-life needs. Your
loved ones will not have to make those decisions for you if you become impaired." Chris
Koster, Life Choices, OFF. Mo. AT'Y GEN. (March 2009), http://ago.mo.gov
/publications/lifechoices/lifechoices.pdf. Court opinions also encourage this view. See In re
Guardianship of M. Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990) ("One does not exercise
another's right of self-determination ... by making a decision which the state, the family,
or public opinion would prefer. The surrogate decisionmaker must be confident that he or
she can and is voicing the patient's decision.").
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B. Principle2: All Patients Should Have a SurrogateDecision
Maker, and the Same Standardsof Decision Making Should
Apply to All Surrogate Decision Makers
End-of-life law has taught us the importance of an identified
surrogate decision maker. State statutes addressing life-sustaining
treatment were, in many states, the first legislative attempts to clearly
identify who had the authority to make medical decisions for the
patient in the event of the patient's incapacity.134 Similarly, advance
directive statutes about life-sustaining treatment first established the
idea of using a legal instrument to appoint an agent to make health
care decisions for a person in the event of later incapacity. 13 5
Everyone should have a person136 who can make medical
decisions for him or her in the event of incapacity, whether questions
of life-sustaining treatment are at issue or not. There are many
situations in which a person may lose capacity, often just temporarily,
but health care decisions must still be made.
Ideally, a patient would choose his or her own agent before one
is needed, and this should be encouraged. Many Americans have not
done so, however,"' which may be due in part to the association of
health care agency appointments with living wills and matters related
to dying. This association might be traced to the federal Patient SelfDetermination Act, 138 which is often considered to be a part of endof-life law, although it is not explicitly so. 139 The Act requires most
health care facilities to ask patients, upon admission, whether they
have an advance directive (a living will or appointment of health care
agent) and to document that answer in the patient's medical record."
The facility must also provide the patient with a written summary of
the patient's health care decision-making rights and the facility's
policies on recognizing, or refusing to follow, advance directives. 4 ' In
134. See Schwartz, supra note 122, at 1158 (discussing history of surrogate decisionmaking statutes). Note that a few states still lack "default surrogate consent statutes" that
specify who can make health care decisions for an incapacitated patient in the absence of a
health care power of attorney. See, e.g., Eric D. Correira, Why Rhode Island Needs Default
Surrogate Consent Statutes, R.I. B.J., Mar.-Apr. 2012, at 11, 11.
135. This instrument was originally known as a durable power of health care attorney.
See Schwartz, supra note 122, at 1162.
136. Or persons. This Article does not take a position on the value of having a single
surrogate decision maker or whether this responsibility might be shared.
137. See supra note 53 (providing statistics).
138. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
139. See id. §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. at 1388-115, 1388-204.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(B) (2012).
141. Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).

2014]

END-OF-LIFELAW

1727

practice, this has meant that facility inquiries about health care agents
have been made at the same time as inquiries about whether the
patient has documented decisions about withholding or withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment. 14 2 And, like many of the statutory forms,
many of the forms offered by hospitals to patients for naming an
agent include information about, and options for, documenting the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.143 Patients
often wish to avoid thinking about the latter issues-a completely
understandable response for many situations. Imagine an otherwise
healthy pregnant woman who arrives in labor to the hospital being
asked, upon admission, whether she has a living will.
This reality means that the mechanism that many hospitals have
in place to ask about and record health care agency designations fails
to encourage them. While end-of-life legislation has led the way in
demonstrating the importance of designating an agent, the method
for doing so must now be de-coupled from living wills and the
advance care planning associated with dying and death. There is some
anecdotal evidence that some hospitals have begun an intentional
effort to offer patients an opportunity to name an agent on a "shortform" document that does not focus on matters related to dire
prognoses but instead anticipates that the need for a surrogate may
arise in unanticipated circumstances and for temporary periods of
incapacity.'" In contrast to the current process, designating a health
care agent should be simple and quick.145
In keeping with the principle that everyone should have a
surrogate decision maker (and preferably one appointed by the
patient), greater efforts need to be made to ensure that no one is
"unrepresented." According to a recent article published by Thad
142. This is because both an appointment of a health care proxy and a living will are
understood to be "advance directives." Id. §1395cc(f)(3) (defining "advance directive").
143. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(dl) (2013) (offering a combined statutory
form); Advance Directive, VA. HosP. CENTER, http://extranet.acsysweb.com
/vSiteManager/VirginiaHosp/Public/Upload/AdvancedDirectiveForm.pdf
(last visited
Mar. 5, 2014) (combined form); Patient and Family Guide to Advance Directives,
BRIGHAM
& WOMEN'S HOSP.,
http://brighamandwomens.org/PatientsVisitors
/pcs/ethics/AdvanceDirEnglish.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (same).
144. See generally K. Michael Lipkin, Identifying a Proxy for Health Care as Part of
Routine Inquiry, 21 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 1188 (2006) (arguing for integrating proxy
designations into routine medical care and reporting results of study showing feasibility of
this approach); K. Michael Lipkin, Advance Medical Planning, 124 ANN. INTERN. MED.
1017 (1996) (urging that physicians routinely ask for a surrogate designation as an
"informal advance directive" to be documented in the medical record). Such a short-form
appointment document is available for use and promoted at the University of Virginia
Health System, for example.
145. See infra Part IV.C (Principle 3).
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Pope, as many as three to four percent of nursing home residents lack
a legally recognized surrogate, as do five percent of patients who die
in U.S. intensive care units.'46 While the law currently permits a
guardian to be appointed by a court for such patients, often no one is
available to serve in this role; indeed, even when one can be found,
the process, according to Pope, is "too slow and cumbersome relative
to the need for treatment decisions, it's expensive, and guardians
often lack time, given their heavy caseloads, to learn about the
patient."l4 7 Pope's solution, when an appropriate surrogate cannot
otherwise be found, is to allow an institutional, multidisciplinary (i.e.,
not "doctors only") ethics committee to assume the role, preferably
one that is external to the health care facility.14 This proposal and
others deserve serious consideration so that every patient has not
only a decision maker but also an advocate.
Finally, there is the question of whether the scope of decisionmaking authority should be the same as between appointed agents
and default surrogates selected from the statutory hierarchy (e.g.,
spouse, adult children, parents, etc.). Some state statutes explicitly
give the appointed agent more authority than a default surrogate, 4 9
or greater authority may be inferred from language suggesting that an
appointed agent can make the same type of decisions that the
principal could have made while competent.150 An argument in favor
of granting greater authority to the appointed agent is that the patient
trusted the agent enough to select him or her to make these decisions.
But there are many reasons a patient may not appoint an agent-for
example, a patient may be reluctant to discuss end-of-life matters and
encounter few obvious opportunities to appoint a health care agent
outside of the context of end-of-life discussions. Or a patient may not
have appointed an agent because he or she knew about the statutory
hierarchy and was comfortable with the person who would become
the default surrogate. There is no compelling evidence to suggest that
patients who have default surrogates trust them less than patients
trust their appointed agents.15' But, more importantly, any limitations
146. Thaddeus M. Pope, Making Medical Decisions for Patients Without Surrogates,
369 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1976, 1976 (2013).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1977.
149. For a discussion of North Carolina's statutes, see supra Part II.B.
150. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, § 7.09[B] ("Other statutes reach the
same result by authorizing the proxy to make decisions to the same extent that the
principal could if the principal possessed decisionmaking capacity.").
151. While I am not aware of any studies comparing the levels of trust principals have
between appointed agents and default surrogates, there are studies showing that when
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on the authority of default surrogates would b.e the sort of limitations
discussed in connecticn with Principle 1152 that should be avoided
because they create impediments to honoring patients' preferences
and interests. In the absence of evidence that default surrogates
perform their roles less responsibly than appointed agents, the scope
of authority for each should be identical.
C. Principle3: Requirementsfor Advance Documentationby
PatientsShould Be Minimal

Some instructions are generally better than none. But formal
documentary requirements should be minimized to make it easier for
people to express their preferences and, therefore, better allow
surrogate decision makers and others to understand and honor their
wishes. Moreover, the need for formal requirements, like witnesses
and notarization, is reduced when we allow written instructions to be
considered in the context of knowledge of patient values and
interests' and reduce the need for people to make strong precommitments about certain treatment options.'54
The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act is a good model for
application of this principle. The Act provides that "[an] instruction
may be either oral or written." 5 There are no documentary
requirements associated with it.' 56 The Act provides an optional
statutory instructional form that contains space for the signature of
two witnesses, but a failure to have witnesses does not invalidate the
document; a signature alone is sufficient.157
Under the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act, a power of
attorney for health care, while it must be in writing, need not be
witnessed or acknowledged." In addition, an individual may orally
designate a surrogate "by personally informing the supervising
health-care provider."' 59 A surrogate designated in this way has the
asked hypothetical scenarios involving decisions about life-sustaining treatment, accuracy
in predicting what the principal would want did not differ between patient-designated and
next-of-kin surrogates. See Shalowitz et al., supra note 100, at 496.
152. See supra Part IV.A (Principle 1).
153. See supra Part IV.A (Principle 1).
154. See infra Part IV.D (Principle 4).
155. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONs Acr § 2(a), 9 U.L.A. 83,93 (1993).
156. Id. § 2 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 95 ("Subsection (h) validates advance health-care
directives which conform to the Act, regardless of when or where executed or
communicated.").
157. Id. § 4 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 106 ("The Act does not require witnessing.").
158. Id. § 2(b) & cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 93 ("The power must be in writing and signed by the
principal.").
159. Id. § 5(b), 9 U.L.A. at 111; see also id. § 1(16), 9 U.L.A. at 90 (" 'Supervising
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same powers with respect to health care decision making as an agent
appointed through a power of attorney document.16 0
These simple rules about documentation apply to revocations as
well, so that a patient may revoke the written designation of an agent
by personally informing the supervising health-care provider.16'
Allowing patients to change their designation of surrogate with such
ease provides some counterweight to concerns that a family member
or another person may fraudulently produce an advance directive
that gives him or her the power to make health care decisions for the
patient. Taking special care to attend to incompetent patients'
protests (see Principle 7)162 also reduces the likelihood that a person
could successfully control the decision-making process against the will
of the patient. Abuses of this nature are not likely to be common.
Moreover, they can occur even with stringent witness and
notarization requirements. Such requirements, for example, did not
prevent the most notorious case of health care agency fraud in recent
years-the Barnes63 case-in which a wife pieced together two
different documents prepared by a lawyer in order to produce an
advance directive that deleted her husband's instructions and retained
her prior, but later revoked, appointment as his proxy.'"

health-care provider' means the primary physician or, if there is no primary physician or
the primary physician is not reasonably available, the health-care provider who has
undertaken primary responsibility for an individual's health care.").
160. Id. § 5 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 113 ("Subsection (g) provides that a health-care decision
made by a surrogate is effective without judicial approval. A similar provision applies to
health-care decisions made by agents.").
161. Id. § 3(a), 9 U.L.A. at 98.
162. See infra Part IV.G (Principle 7).
163. In re Emergency Guardianship of Barnes, No. 27-GC-PR-111-16 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Feb. 4, 2011), available at http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/Barnes_Court
_Ruling_02-04-11.pdf.
164. Id.; see also Ruth A. Mickelsen et al., supra note 9, at 374. One deficiency of the
Uniform Health Care Decisions Act regarding surrogacy designation should be noted,
which is that its default list does not recognize domestic partners. See UNIF. HEALTHCARE DECISIONS ACT § 5(c), 9 U.L.A. at 111. The list it provides mirrors that of many
states: spouse; adult child; parent; adult brother or sister; and, if none of the foregoing are
reasonably available, "an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient,
who is familiar with the patient's personal values, and who is reasonably available." Id.
Although the comment to this provision explains that the default rule "incorporates the
presumed desires of a majority of those who find themselves [without a designated
surrogate]," it would appear to fall short of that goal by allowing domestic partners to
serve as surrogates only as a last resort through the final category of an unrelated adult.
See id. § 5 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 112. This means that a person in a non-traditional partnership
who wishes to have health care decisions made by his or her companion will have to follow
the procedures contained in the Act to appoint the companion through a health care
power of attorney or designate him or her as surrogate. The latter, at least, is quite simple.
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D. Principle4: Binding Pre-Commitments Should Be Allowed Only
Sparingly and for Compelling Reasons; They Should Not Be
Required or Encouraged
As discussed above, one could reasonably understand Hanford
Pinette's living will providing for a "natural death" to represent his
attempt to grant authority to his wife to withhold or withdraw lifeprolonging measures rather than to provide a directive for her to do
so. 65 First generation living will and durable power of health care
attorney forms have frequently failed to coordinate well with one
another, 166 as seen iin the example of the North Carolina statutes
before the 2007 revisions. 6 7 Today, it has become much more
commonplace for these forms to be combined,"e and there appears to
be an emerging trend to place more emphasis on the agency
appointment rather than the instructions, and for agents to be given
the power to make certain decisions without requiringthat they make
them in a way predetermined by the principal. 69
These reforms move end-of-life law in the right direction-away
from requirements that a person pre-commit to a certain course of
action or rules that encourage one to do so. There are, however,
plenty of instances of statutory schemes and statutory living will
forms that continue to require or encourage pre-commitment. For
example, the Oklahoma statutory formO asks people to choose, for
each of three conditions (terminal condition, persistent
unconsciousness, and end-stage condition), 7' whether they would like
life-sustaining treatment or not, with separate, specific instructions

165. See supraPart II.A.
166. This is due, in part, to the fact that durable powers of health care attorney were
generally authorized by state law several years after living wills were authorized. See
Schwartz, supra note 122, at 1161-62 (explaining that living will legislation preceded
legislation to allow the appointment of health care agents).
167. See supraPart II.B (discussing North Carolina's statutes).
168. See Schwartz, supra note 122, at 1162.
169. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25.1 (2013) (providing a statutory health care
power of attorney form, which gives the agent broad powers but allows the principal to
add specific limitations if desired); id. § 90-321(dl) (2013) (providing a living will form
which, in paragraph six, allows the patient to state whether, in the event the patient has
appointed a health care agent who gives instructions that differ from this form (living will),
the living will instruction can or cannot be so overridden by the agent's instructions). The
North Carolina forms are discussed in Part II.B, supra.
170. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.4 (West Supp. 2013).
171. "End-stage condition" is defined in the statutory form as "a condition caused by
injury, disease, or illness, which results in severe and permanent deterioration indicated by
incompetency and complete physical dependency for which ... treatment of the
irreversible condition would be medically ineffective." Id. § 3101.3(4).
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about artificial nutrition and hydration.172 The form, which also allows
for appointment of a health care proxy, makes clear that the proxy is
only allowed to make decisions about life-sustaining treatment and
artificially administered nutrition and hydration as instructed on the
form, and emphasizes that the living will instructions are the "final
expression of [the patient's] legal right to choose or refuse" treatment
and that the signer "accept[s] the consequences of such choice or
refusal.""' Even the generally quite reasonable Uniform Health Care
Decisions Act provides an advance directive form that allows a
person to instruct that "artificial nutrition and hydration must be
provided regardless of my condition" and regardless of other choices
made about life-prolonging measures.174
Health care decisions generally-and not just those relating to
life-sustaining treatment-should be made close to the time they are
to be implemented, so that those decisions can reflect the facts then
existing. This is true whether those facts concern the patient's medical
condition and prognosis, the patient's relationships, or the state of
advancing medical knowledge. We must be especially cautious in
following advance instructions that are contrary to a patient's current,
17
individualized best interests"
or contrary to a patient's current
expressions, even if the patient's decision-making capacity may
appear diminished at the time. Certainly the law should not
encourage patients to bind themselves to future treatment decisions
that they have inadequate knowledge to make; nor should the law
give expressions about such decisions a legal imprimatur they do not
deserve.
That said, pre-commitment may be appropriate in some
circumstances. For example, the legally recognized Durable Do Not
Resuscitate Order involves a pre-commitment by a patient to refuse
cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") in the event of a cardiac or
respiratory arrest.176 Because the decision whether or not to initiate
CPR must be made in seconds or minutes, emergency personnel must
be able to follow it without engaging in lengthy, or really, any,
conversation about whether this is truly what the arresting individual

172. Id. § 3101.4(C)(I)(1)-(3).
173. Id. § 3101.4(C)(IV)(d).

§ 4 explanation, 9 U.L.A.83,100 (1993).
175. See generally Dresser, supra note 54, at 1839-40 (discussing situations in which
patient directives should be overridden when it would be detrimental to the incompetent
patient).
176. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987.1 (2013).
174. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONs AcT
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wants. If it were otherwise, people would not have a right to refuse
CPR that they could effectively exercise.
Pre-commitment may also be appropriate for some mental health
treatment decisions. Mental health advance directives allow
individuals with severe mental illness, when in possession of decisionmaking capacity, to express their preferences about hospitalization,
certain medications, and other potential treatments that can be
honored in the event of a later lapse in capacity.7 They have been
hailed by many proponents "as a way to empower consumers to take
a more active role in their own treatment, and as a way to avoid
damaging, divisive conflicts over treatment and medication issues.""'
Some states allow patients to include a "Ulysses clause" in their
mental health advance directives, by which they consent to future
treatment even in the event of their later protest.179 These
extraordinary clauses have a strong pre-commitment basis, and the
extent to which they are legally binding is not yet clear. 8 oThey do not
elicit the same concerns as end-of-life pre-commitment decisions
when they are individualized, executed with the guidance of mental
health professionals with whom a patient has an established
relationship, and allow treatment that is in the best medical interests
of the patient. They are also accompanied by extraordinary
procedural safeguards, such as a capacity assessment and witness
requirement by a physician at the time of signing."' Such strong precommitment mechanisms should only be recognized in the most
compelling and narrow of circumstances.
The most recent innovation in end-of-life law, the National
Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment ("POLST")
Paradigm,'8 2 deserves some mention here. The POLST Paradigm is a
177. See, e.g., Advance Directives for Mental Health Treatment, DEPRESSION &
BIPOLAR SUPPORT

ALLIANCE,

http://www.dbsalliance.org/site/PageServer?pagename

=urgent advancedirectives (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
178. Ronald S. Honberg, Advance Directives, NAT'L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Legal/AdvanceDirectives.htm (last visited
Jan. 22,2014).
179. See, e.g., § 54.1-2986.2(C).
180. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, PsychiatricAdvance Directives and the Treatment of
Committed Patients, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 751, 752-53 (2004) (admitting that just how
often legal issues will arise "remains to be seen"); Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Superseding
Psychiatric Advance Directives: Ethical and Legal Considerations, 34 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 385, 393 (2006) (noting that it is "too soon to tell" what the future holds
for these agreements).
181. See, e.g., § 54.1-2986.2(C).
182. The website of the National POLST Paradigm contains many useful resources. See
Resources, POLST, http://www.polst.org/educational-resources (last visited Mar. 2, 2014);
see also Susan E. Hickman et al., The POLST (Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining
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program begun in Oregon in 1991 that allows physicians to document,
in a simple one-page (back and front) form, orders about patients'
end-of-life care decisions that other physicians and health care
providers can follow across treatment settings. 83 The POLST form is
intended for use in determining the care of seriously ill or frail
persons." The form is not an advance directive, but is rather an
instrument that can translate the instructions of an advance directive
or decisions of a surrogate decision maker or the patient him or
herself, when competent, into actionable medical orders.'
The
treatment decisions documented in it should reflect the current goals
of care and condition of the patient rather than decisions about
distant, more hypothetical situations, and the orders in it can be relied
upon by health care providers in emergent situations. 86 One premise
of the program is that POLST forms will be reviewed whenever there
is a change in the care facility or medical condition of the patient.
Then, or actually at any time, they can be revised by joint agreement
of the patient, or surrogate decision maker, and physician. For
example, a chronically ill patient's first POLST form might document
his wish (and his physician's corresponding order) for full treatment
interventions, but, following a serious decline in medical condition,
this earlier preference might change and the patient and physician
together might create a new POLST form that orders only limited
interventions and avoidance of hospital intensive care units. If and
when a patient loses capacity, surrogate decision makers generally
have the same power as the patient to seek similar, appropriate
modification of the POLST form to respond to changes in the
patient's condition."'
Treatment) Paradigm to Improve End-of-Life Care: Potential State Legal Barriers to
Implementation, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHics 119, 119 (2008) (describing POLST program and
detailing potential state law barriers to implementation, such as medical pre-conditions
and witnessing requirements).
183. See
History,
POLST,
http://www.polst.orglabout-the-national-polstparadigm/history/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). For examples of state POLST forms, see
State-by-State POLST Forms, EVERPLANS, https://www.everplans.com/tools-andresources/state-by-state-polst-forms (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
184. See About the National POLST Paradigm, POLST, http://www.polst.org/aboutthe-national-polst-paradigm/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
185. See POLST and Advance Directives, POLST, http://www.polst.org/advance-careplanning/polst-and-advance-directives/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
186. See id.
187. See id. (noting that POLST forms only cover medical orders for current
treatment).
188. See FAQ, POLST, http://www.polst.org/advance-care-planning/faq/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2014).
189. See, for example, the California and Oregon POLST forms, which can be found at
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The POLST initiative is generally a positive one. 90 It is primarily
a tool to communicate across a fragmented health care system. It can
prevent an unwanted, traumatic, and high-intensity middle-of-the
night transfer to the hospital from a nursing home that might
otherwise occur simply because a doctor has not issued a "do not
hospitalize" order or specified "comfort measures only."191
Physicians' orders are a time-honored mechanism for physicians to
direct other health care providers in caring for a patient in their
absence. POLST forms allow that communication to occur between
independent facilities.'92
E. Principle5: Rushed Decisions That People Do Not or Should Not
Want to "Live Like That" Should Be Avoided
Current end-of-life law's enormous emphasis on asking and
expecting surrogate decision makers to know what the patient would
want has arguably contributed to a developing tendency for families
to rush to certain and final conclusions to withhold or withdraw life-

State-by-State POLST Forms, supra note 183. Some of the POLST forms do include a
somewhat troubling statement that any section not completed implies full treatment for
the types of treatments specified in that section. See, e.g., 2011 California POLST Form,
CAPOLST, http://www.capoist.org/documents/CAPOLSTform2011v13web005.pdf (last
visited
Jan.
22,
2014);
Oregon
POLST Form, POLST
OREGON,
http://www.oregonpolst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Printing-POLST.pdf (last visited
Jan. 22, 2014). This is not so much a problem of unnecessary pre-commitment, since the
forms can and are expected to be revised over time, but is a problem of scripting choices.
See infra Part IV.F (Principle 6). Rather than assume that incomplete sections imply
treatment, it would be more reasonable to assume that no decision has been made by the
patient (or surrogate, if appropriate) about the treatment option that was skipped in filling
out the form. In other words, there should be no default-the decision has yet to be made.
190. For a critique of the POLST Paradigm, see Stanley A. Terman, It Isn't Easy Being
Pink: Potential Problems with POLST Paradigm Forms, 36 HAMLINE L. REv. 177, 178
(2013).
191. See Scheible v. Joseph L. Morse Geriatric Ctr., Inc., 988 So. 2d 1130,1131 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2008) (explaining the situation of a nursing home resident who was transferred to
a hospital, despite her living will that expressed contrary preferences). See generally
Marshall B. Kapp, Legal Anxieties and End-of-Life Care in Nursing Homes, 19 ISSUES L. &
MED. 111 (2003) (detailing the extent to which inappropriate transfers and other
aggressive end-of-life measures occur in nursing homes because of anxiety about legal
repercussions).
192. See Susan E. Hickman et al., A Comparison of Methods to Communicate
Treatment Preferences in Nursing Facilities: Traditional Practices Versus the Physician
Ordersfor Life-Sustaining Treatment Program, 58 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1241, 124647 (2010) ("The POLST program is built upon a coordinated system of care across
treatment settings that includes emergency services, hospitals, primary care practices,
hospices, and nursing facilities and relies on standardized, specific orders for a range of
treatments, which makes the POLST program unique and may explain its apparent
success.").
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sustaining treatment on the basis of quick and insistent beliefs that
their family member would "not want to live like that," meaning,
generally, in some condition of impairment or with a loss of function.
But "like that" is sometimes a condition in which objectively many
people would in fact like to live-or at least would like to see how
matters progress over the ensuing days, weeks, or months before
making such an irrevocable decision. And while it would be
reasonable in such circumstances to slow down the process, it is not
clear that existing legal and ethical norms-which place great
emphasis on "what the patient would want"-give physicians and
others the tools to do that.
A recent Atlantic article by Ashwaq Masoodi describes one such
scenario.'93 Joseph Brown, a thirty-six-year-old man, had become ill
with necrotizing fasciitis (a flesh-eating infection). 9 4 While the
prognosis was initially very poor, physicians came to believe that the
patient would recover, although he would lose some or all of his limbs
to amputation. 95 The family was told of this improved prognosis but
insisted that, as a manual laborer, the man would not want to live if
he could not have all his limbs.' 96 They wanted doctors to disconnect
his ventilator and allow him to die.' The Atlantic article describes
the family as "adamant," "unequivocal," and "sure that he would
prefer death to life with disability."9 9
The patient's attending physician hesitated to follow this family's
instruction to discontinue life support.199 He called an ethics consult.2 0
The consulting ethicist, Dr. Kenneth Prager, pointed to Brown's
improving prognosis and the uncertainty about what he would want:
"He (Brown) could never have envisaged this," Dr. Prager told
Masoodi, "I don't know how the relatives could possibly know what
he would have wanted." 201
During the delay caused by the ethics consultation, Brown's
condition continued to improve. 20 Nevertheless, and despite
193. Ashwaq Masoodi, Make Your Wishes Known, ATLANTIC (July 10, 2013, 10:46
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.comlhealthlarchive/2013/07/make-your-wishesknown/277654/.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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hesitation on the part of the hospital's ethics committee, the family
was ultimately given the option to discontinue mechanical
ventilation. 203 The family "feared that if the process were delayed,
Brown would have a life of unwanted disability."2" The ventilator
was removed, as the family requested, but Brown began breathing on
his own.205 When he regained consciousness, Brown was asked what
he wanted done in terms of further measures to extend his life.2 06
After being informed that amputation of his limbs was still likely, he
said, contrary to his family's expectations, "Do whatever it takes." 207
Another recent news story reveals a similar urgency on the part
of a family to allow a patient to die. 208 This story is somewhat
different, however, in that the patient was brought out of sedation
and asked what he would want done. 209 Tim Bowers was a 32-year-old
married man with a baby on the way.210 A fall from a tree while
hunting caused severe injuries to his spine.211 Physicians believed that
he would be permanently paralyzed from the shoulders down and
might always be dependent on a ventilator to breathe.2 12 The family
believed they knew Bowers would not want to live like that, and
asked if he could be brought out of sedation, told of his condition,
and asked whether he wanted to live or die. 213 The physicians agreed
to this plan.2 14 Bowers, who had not suffered any brain injury, was
brought to a state of alertness in which physicians felt he had
decision-making capacity, told his prognosis, and asked if he wanted
to continue with life support. 215 Bowers, according to his sister,
"shook his head emphatically no," when asked, "Do you want
this?" 216 Bowers was subsequently removed from the ventilator; he

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Jeni O'Malley, Indiana Hunter Paralyzed in Fall Chooses to End Life Support,
NBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/indiana-hunterparalyzed-fall-chooses-end-life-support-8C11535734.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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died within a few hours.217 The fall occurred on Saturday; Bowers was
removed from life support and died on Sunday.2 18
The speed with which this all occurred should make us
uncomfortable. While patients have the right to make these choices,
how quickly should they be asked to make them? Instead of bringing
Mr. Bowers out of sedation to ask him if he wanted to die, would not
it have been better to comfort him with the message that his life,
though altered, could still bring him and others meaning and
enjoyment? Above all, should he not be allowed more time to
comprehend not only the limitations of his new condition, but the
potential solutions or means of coping? Many people who have
experienced severe loss of function later find life as satisfying or more
satisfying than life before their accident or illness and experience
happiness on par with people who do not have a severe disability.219
These stories share at least two critical features in common. The
first is a sense of urgency that there is a short window in which to
make these sorts of decisions or some opportunity may be lost 2 20
(what that opportunity is merits some review, as it is entangled in our
preconceptions and sometimes misconceptions of disability). The
second is a certainty about the wishes of another person that seems
unsubstantiated and reasonably open to doubt. Important medical
decisions tend to be complex; legal and ethical norms cannot allow
them to be over-simplified. We need to develop guidelines and
practices to allow physicians and hospitals to slow down and allow
reconsideration of these quick judgments, without unduly impairing
patient autonomy.2 2 1 Realizing that we cannot understand patient
autonomy to be appropriately represented by simple declarations
(Principle 1)222 may help us in this endeavor, although this way of
thinking has been encouraged for some time.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Adrienne Asch, Recognizing Death While Affirming Life: Can End of Life
Reform Uphold a Disabled Person's Interest in Continued Life?, HASTINGS CENTER REP.
(SPECIAL REP.), Nov.-Dec. 2005, at S31, S32.
220. See generally Thomas I. Cochrane, Unnecessary Time Pressures in Refusal of LifeSustaining Therapies: Fear of Missing the Opportunity to Die, 9 AM. J. BIOETHICS 47
(2009) (discussing the dilemma some surrogate decision makers face in deciding whether
to pursue treatment for a patient that may, if unsuccessful, result in a situation of severe
disability but no plug to pull, so to speak).
221. See Burt, supra note 132, at S12-S13 (arguing for a continuation of life-sustaining
treatment "until all affected participants (family members and clinicians)" engage in a
consultative process in which they have a voice, but not a veto, about such decisions for
both competent and incompetent patients).
222. See supra Part IV.A (Principle 1).
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Disability rights organizations and scholars have long protested
that many end-of-life decisions made in the name of patient
autonomy rest on invalid and patronizing assumptions about the poor
quality of life experienced by people with disabilities.223 They raise
similar concerns about common practices in prenatal testing and the
abortion of fetuses affected with genetic anomalies-practices that
also are shaped by law.224 Many of their concerns are valid, and much
work needs to be done in this area. There are promising signs that a
"disability-conscious" approach to bioethics is emerging, in which
concerns about disability discrimination have entered mainstream
bioethics.225
F.

Principle6: Communication About Health Care Decisions Should
Be Encouragedbut Not Scripted by Law

It is never easy for the law to require or even encourage
provider-patient communication about health care decisions without
proposing a script for one, whether intentionally or not.226 This is
especially so when communications are aimed at particular health
care decisions, such as whether or not to have an abortion. Many
recent state efforts, under the name of "Women's Right to Know
Acts," do not even pretend to be neutral in requiring information to
be provided to women in the form of descriptions of the
developmental stage of the fetus or the showing of ultra-sound
images.227
223. See Asch, supra note 219, at S32; Longmore, supra note 18, at 141; Adam A.
Milani, Better Off Dead Than Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a "Wrongful Living"
Cause of Action When Doctors Fail to Honor Patients'Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 149, 216-27 (1997).

224. See Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or
Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 316 (2003); Martha A. Field, Killing "The
Handicapped"-Beforeand After Birth, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 79, 80-81 (1993); Erik
Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing:
Reflections and Recommendations, HASTINGS CENTER REP. (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT),

Sept.-Oct. 1999, at S1, S1-S2.
225. See ALICIA OUELLETTE, BIOETHICS AND DISABILITY: TOWARD A DISABILITYCONSCIOUS BIOETHICS 10-11 (2011).

226. See Suter, supranote 2, at 51.
227. See id. at 44. In a recent ruling striking down North Carolina's ultrasound law,
codified at sections 90-21.80 through 90-21.92 of the North Carolina General Statutes, the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina held that the First
Amendment rights of the plaintiffs (physicians and other health care providers) were
violated by the "speech-and-display provision" of the law, which required that a provider
"must display ultrasound images so that the patient may view them and must describe the
images to the patient." Stuart v. Loomis, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014 WL 186310, at *1
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014). The opinion states,
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Legislation relating to end-of-life decisions has been far less
intentional in directing people toward certain choices, 228 but it has
nonetheless done so. 229 As already noted, first generation living will
forms did not present individuals with the option to document their
wish for continued life-sustaining treatment, the assumption being
that if continued treatment were desired, one would not have or need
a living will. 230 In response, some right-to-life groups have created
living will forms that direct that life-prolonging measures always be
continued.231 While newer state-approved forms tend to allow either
option, it would be preferable for states to get out of this business
altogether. If states adopted fewer and less burdensome documentary
requirements for people to communicate their preferences about lifesustaining treatment (Principle 3),232 the need for state-approved
forms would diminish.
As noted in the introduction to this Article, an early version of
the Affordable Care Act included reimbursement for doctors
undertaking conversations with their Medicare patients about
advance care planning.233 While the conversation was not scripted per
se, the provision did require that, to be eligible for reimbursement,
certain topics had to be covered, including living wills, durable health
care powers of attorney, the availability of hospice and palliative care,
the roles and responsibilities of a health care agent, and "a list of
national and state-specific resources to assist consumers and their
families with advance care planning, including the national toll-free
The Supreme Court has never held that a state has the power to compel a health
care provider to speak, in his or her own voice, the state's ideological message in
favor of carrying a pregnancy to term, and this Court declines to do so today. To
the extent the Act is an effort by the state to require health care providers to
deliver information in support of the state's philosophic and social position
discouraging abortion and encouraging childbirth, it is content-based, and it is not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny.
Id.
228. See Suter, supra note 2, at 49 (noting that there are currently no state mandates
requiring the use of images or descriptions of various treatments like those required in the
abortion context).
229. See id. at 29, 36 (explaining that "end-of-life informed consent statutes" in states
such as California and Michigan have been criticized for intending to influence end-of-life
decisions through disclosures of non-medical information).
230. See supranote 66 and accompanying text.
231. See NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM'N, http://www.nrlc.org/medethics/willtolive/ (last
visited Jan. 29,2014) (operating like a living will but aiming to "protect your life"); see also
Shepherd, supra note 86, at 380-81 & nn.103--06, 390-93 (describing the "Will to Live" and
giving an example of the form in the appendix).
232. See supraPart IV.C (Principle 3).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
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hotline, the advance care planning clearinghouses, and State legal
service organizations."' Critics' distortion of this provision as
creating a "death panel" was clearly dishonest."
Medicare
beneficiaries were not required to have such conversations and there
was no indication that physicians were encouraged to use these
conversations to convince patients to choose less aggressive medical
care. Yet reasonable people might nevertheless have had some
concerns about the degree to which the subject matter was dictated.
State laws that mandate the provision of certain information in the
end-of-life context, such as those recently enacted in California and
New York can cause similar discomfort.236
In place of special incentives or requirements for conversations
about certain topics (e.g., abortion, prenatal screening,2 7 diagnoses of
terminal illness, and options for hospice), we should improve
reimbursement and other incentives for conversation between
providers and patients in all health care matters. This is especially
appropriate given the increasing recognition that reimbursement
rules contribute to our procedure-driven medical care system, as
doing procedures is much more financially rewarding to providers
than engaging in thoughtful conversations with patients about
whether they should be done.
G. Principle 7: AppropriateSafeguards to ProtectPatients with
Diminished Capacity Are Needed

Much of end-of-life law is justified as protecting patients who are
vulnerable because they have never had or have lost decision-making
capacity and the opportunity for autonomous action. Until 2002, for
example, New York, in the name of protecting vulnerable patients,
prohibited surrogate decision makers from withholding or
234. H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 1233 (2009) (later revised).
235. See Nyhan, supra note 6, at 1.
236. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (West Supp. 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 333.5654-.5655 (West Supp. 2012); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c (McKinney
Supp. 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1871 (Supp. 2012); see also Steven E. Weinberger et al.,
Legislative Interference with the Patient-Physician Relationship, 367 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1557, 1557 (2012) (criticizing legislative attempts to "dictate the nature and content of
patients' interactions with their physicians," including statutes requiring certain disclosures
to terminally ill patients).
237. See CAL CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 6527(a) (2008) (requiring physicians to inform
women about the availability of certain prenatal tests by using information in a format
provided or approved by the Department of Health Services); Sonia M. Suter, The
Routinization of PrenatalTesting, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 253 (2002) (describing how the
California mandate caused physicians to overreach in persuading their patients to have the
test, since having the test was "the clearest evidence of compliance").
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withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from anyone who had always
lacked capacity to make health care decisions." In the famous case of
Sheila Pouliot, this legal standard resulted in the imposition of
treatments that prolonged suffering and were widely considered
inhumane. 239 Legal requirements for special documentation when a
patient wishes to forgo artificial nutrition and hydration are similarly
grounded in fear that feeding tubes will be denied to patients who
want them, when in fact the opposite is true-feeding tubes are used
far more often than medically beneficial or desired.'
Patients who lack decision-making capacity do need special
protections, but those protections should be more carefully directed
toward actual rather than imagined vulnerabilities. Here are three
such safeguards.
First, the law should include clear procedures to enhance patient
involvement in decision making. Most importantly, considerable care
must be taken to ensure that surrogate decision makers are not asked
to make decisions for individuals who actually still retain (or have reattained) the capacity to make decisions for themselves. There is
growing recognition that capacity can wax and wane, and that while
individuals may lack capacity to make complex decisions, they may
retain it to make simpler ones. 241 Even absent decision-making
capacity, processes should be in place to involve patients in their
health care treatment plans by providing information and
opportunities for assent. In addition, processes should be in place to
238. See In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981) ("A parent or guardian has a right
to consent to medical treatment on behalf of an infant. The parent, however, may not
deprive a child of life saving treatment, however well intentioned."), superseded by statute,
Health Care Decisions Act for Persons with Mental Retardation, ch. 500, § 3, 2002 N.Y.
Laws 3375, 3376 (codified at N.Y. SURROGATE'S Cr. PROC. Acr LAW § 1750-b
(McKinney Supp. 2014)), as recognized in In re M.B., 846 N.E.2d 794, 795 (N.Y. 2006). See
generally Alicia R. Ouellette, When Vitalism Is Dead Wrong: The DiscriminationAgainst
and Torture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment, 79 IND.
L.J. 1, 13-18 (2004) (explaining prior New York law and describing the case of Sheila
Pouliot in which the State of New York would not allow the surrogate of a woman, who
had always lacked decision-making capacity, to authorize the withholding or withdrawal of
artificial nutrition and hydration).
239. See generally OUELLETTE, supra note 225, at 13-18 (describing the Pouliot case).
In response to Pouliot's case, New York law now allows surrogates more discretion. See
N.Y. SURR. Cr. PROC. ACT LAW § 1750 (McKinney 2010).
240. See SHEPHERD, IF THAT EVER HAPPENS TO ME, supra note 43, at 155-57.
241. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS, Opinion 8.081 (2012) ("In some instances, a patient with diminished or

impaired decision-making capacity can participate in various aspects of health care
decision making. The attending physician should promote the autonomy of such
individuals by involving them to a degree commensurate with their capabilities.").
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take notice of and respect, to the extent feasible, incapacitated
patients' protests about health care decisions.
Virginia law provides a good model on many of these fronts. Two
physicians (or a physician and clinical psychologist) must determine
that the patient lacks capacity before health care decisions may be
made by a patient's agent, and those determinations must be
documented in the medical record.2 42 At least one of those physicians
must be independent, meaning not involved in the care of the
patient.243 The capacity determination is only good for 180 days and
must be recertified after that time, except when the patient is
''unconscious or experiencing a profound impairment of
consciousness due to trauma, stroke, or other acute physiological
condition." 2" In addition, an attending physician must inform a
patient, if she is able to understand, that a determination has been
made that she lacks capacity and who will be making decisions on her
behalf.2 45 A determination that the patient has regained capacity can
be made by a single physician.246 When a patient who lacks decisionmaking capacity protests a health care decision, that protest must be
heeded unless certain procedural and substantive standards are
met.247
Second, we need special safeguards for contexts in which there is
a strong record of past abuse. Many state laws carve out certain types
of decisions that surrogate decision makers cannot make for others
without meeting higher or different standards by which those
decisions are judged. 248 Some may require court review. 249 A standard
242. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983.2(B) (2013). In addition, all adults are presumed
capable of making health care decisions until determined otherwise, and "[n]o person shall
be deemed incapable of making an informed decision based solely on a particular clinical
diagnosis." Id. § 54.1-2983.2(A).
243. Id. § 54.1-2983.2(B). There is an exception if an independent capacity reviewer is
not reasonably available. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. § 54.1-2983.2(C).
246. Id. § 54.1-2983.2(D).
247. See id. § 54.1-2986.2.
248. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 21-2211 (2001) ("No person authorized to act pursuant to
§ 21-2210 [providing for surrogate decision making] shall have the power: (1) To consent
to an abortion, sterilization or psycho-surgery, unless authorized by a court; or (2) To
consent to convulsive therapy or behavior modification programs involving aversive
stimuli, unless authorized by a court."); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983.3(B) ("The
provisions of this article [the Health Care Decisions Act] shall not apply to authorization
of nontherapeutic sterilization, abortion, or psychosurgery.").
249. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.660(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) ("[A] guardian may
not consent on behalf of a ward to an abortion, sterilization, psychosurgery, removal of a
bodily organ, or amputation of a limb unless the procedure is first approved by order of
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set of decisions should probably continue to be subject to special
scrutiny because of past historical abuse. 250 A number of states do not
permit health care agents to commit an individual to a mental health
facility or to agree to sterilization, abortion, or psychosurgery.251
Constitutional guarantees may also require heightened protection for
some of these decisions.252
Decisions about withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment, however, should no longer fall into this category. The
courts were right when they expressed, through the 1970s and 80s,
that these decisions needed to be routinely made outside of court
review." The fact that multiple parties-patients, surrogate decision
makers, family members, physicians, nurses, hospital administrators,
and sometimes ethics committees-are typically involved in making
the court or is necessary, in an emergency situation, to preserve the life or prevent serious
impairment of the physical health of the ward."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-13(4) (2012)
(requiring "a mental health proceeding or other court order" for surrogate consent "for
sterilization, abortion, or psychosurgery or for admission to a state mental health facility
for a period of more than forty-five days").
250. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Valerie N. v. Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 764-71 (Cal.
1985) (describing history of eugenic sterilization and passage of subsequent laws in
California to protect incompetent individuals from involuntary sterilization); Mike E.
Jorgensen, Is Today the Day We Free Electroconvulsive Therapy?, 12 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 1, 6 n.23 (2008) (discussing history of abusive practices in psychosurgery and
electroconvulsive therapy); Paul A. Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three
Generations of ??? Are Enough?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 191, 194-202 (2003) (describing
Virginia's past eugenics sterilization laws and practices).
251. See supranote 248 (citing and quoting the Virginia and D.C. statutes).
252. See, e.g., Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv. v. Kirkendall, 841 F. Supp. 796, 801 (E.D.
Mich. 1993) ("[Tlhe due process and equal protection clauses of the United States
Constitution demand that any involuntary sterilization of [plaintiff, a mentally ill
individual] or others similarly situated, occur only after a full evidentiary hearing has been
held to determine the propriety of such an extreme measure in relation to the rights of the
patient."); see also Anne Tamar-Mattis, Sterilization and Minors with Intersex Conditions
in California Law, 3 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 126, 130-31 (2012) (noting that the
constitutional right to reproductive freedom likely requires judicial review of parental
decision to sterilize minor with intersex condition); Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur
Treatment Competence Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 137, 147-48 (1996) (discussing constitutional protections regarding certain
forms of involuntary mental health treatment such as electroconvulsive therapy and
psychosurgery).
253. See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 449 (N.J. 1987) ("No matter how expedited, judicial
intervention in this complex and sensitive area may take too long. Thus, it could infringe
the very rights that we want to protect. The mere prospect of a cumbersome, intrusive and
expensive court proceeding, during such an emotional and upsetting period in the lives of
a patient and his or her loved ones, would undoubtedly deter many persons from deciding
to discontinue treatment. And even if the patient or the family were willing to submit to
such a proceeding, it is likely that the patient's rights would nevertheless be frustrated by
judicial deliberation. Too many patients have died before their right to reject treatment
was vindicated in court." (citations omitted)).
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and executing important medical decisions provides an important,
and usually adequate, check against inappropriate decisions.
But that does not mean that court review should not be available
to parties who have a significant personal interest in the health care
decision being made. Although decisions to forgo life-sustaining
treatment should not require court review, access to courts should be
available. Agreement among the various parties involved in such
decisions cannot always be reached, and court review is an
appropriate forum for resolving intractable disputes. Many end-of-life
state laws explicitly provide a process for accessing such review.254
On the other hand, the Texas Advance Directives Act 255 allows
health care facilities to unilaterally discontinue life-sustaining
treatment over a surrogate's objection without the opportunity for
substantive court review.256 Under the provisions of the Act,
unilateral termination of treatment can take place provided that the
facility's ethics committee agrees, notice and an opportunity to
participate in the ethics consultation process is provided to the family,
and transfer of the patient to another facility is attempted.2 57 The Act
allows a court to grant an order extending the time period for
treatment only if a facility transfer appears possible; the court is not
permitted to engage in a substantive review of the merits of the
254. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.105 (West 2010) (allowing health care agent's
decisions to be challenged by the patient's family, the health care facility, the attending
physician, or "any other interested person who may reasonably be expected to be directly
affected by the ... decision").

255. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (West 2010).
256. Id. § 166.046(g) ("At the request of the patient or the person responsible for the
health care decisions of the patient, the appropriate district or county court shall extend
the time period provided under Subsection (e) only if the court finds, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that there is a reasonable expectation that a physician or health care
facility that will honor the patient's directive will be found if the time extension is
granted."); Nikolouzos v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 162 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tex. App.
2005) ("Section 166.046 does not expressly provide a right to appeal the trial court's ruling
on a request for extension of time for life sustaining treatment, thus indicating the
legislature did not intend to permit such an appeal."); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical
Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75
TENN. L. REV. 1, 80 (2007) (explaining why Texas's statute, in contrast to others, is a
"pure process approach"); Amir Halevy & Amy L. McGuire, The History, Successes and
Controversies of the Texas "Futility" Policy, Hous. LAWYER (May/June 2006),
http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa-mayO6/page38.htm ("The statute explicitly limits
the ability of the courts to intervene in such cases. The courts' only role is the ability to
grant an extension of the ten-day waiting period if the court finds, 'by a preponderance of
the evidence, that there is a reasonable expectation that a physician or health care facility
that will honor the patient's directive will be found if the time extension is granted.' There
is no specific provision allowing a patient, family, or physician to appeal the decision of the
hospital review committee in court.").
257. § 166.046.
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facility's decision. 258 The Act has faced sharp criticism, 25 9 and rightly
so, because the internal ethics committee-rather than an
independent body governed by rules and precedent-is essentially the
final arbiter of the decision.
When disputes wind up in court, we often take this as a sign of
failure. 260 And if all decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment were
resolved by courts, that conclusion would be apt. But sometimes
courts are the best forum to bring clarity to a set of facts or to resolve
disagreements over fundamental values. Efforts by state legislatures
to avoid court involvement in end-of-life and other health care
decisions may have gone too far. Statutes governing health care
decisions, particularly those relating to life-sustaining treatment, have
become more and more specific, as have advance directive forms, as if
every potential conflict might be anticipated and resolved in advance.
What to do when a spouse has been named as a health care agent but
now the couple is separated? What to do when the instructional
directive conflicts with the decisions of the appointed health care
agent? Certainly, some of the legal mechanisms established by
statute, such as health care powers of attorney and default surrogate
statutes, have been helpful. But anticipating and definitively resolving
in advance every combination of life circumstances is not only
impossible, but legislative attempts to do so can create barriers to
respecting and caring for patients.
H. Principle8: Relief of Pain and Suffering Should Always Be
Permitted and Consideredan Important Goal of Care
For many years, terminally ill patients have had to choose either
to continue aggressive, curative therapies or to choose palliative care
and hospice.2 6' As a matter of practice, hospital-based specialty
palliative consults, which did not see widespread adoption until the
early 2000s, 262 have often been seen as something to be done after the
258. See § 166.046.
259. See Robert D. Truog, Tackling Medical Futility in Texas, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1,
2 (2007) (criticizing the Act and explaining that "the ethics committee is acting, under
Texas law, as a surrogate judge and jury, with the statutory power to authorize clinicians
to take actions against the wishes of a patient and family, with protection against civil and
criminal liability").
260. See Alan Meisel, The Role of Litigation in End of Life Care: A Reappraisal,
HASTINGS CENTER REP. (SPECIAL REP.), Nov.-Dec. 2005, at S47, S47 (discussing
limitations and costs to end-of-life litigation).
261. See Alexi A. Wright & Ingrid T. Katz, Letting Go of the Rope-Aggressive
Treatment, Hospice Care, and Open Access, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 324, 324 (2007).
262. See Stephen R. Connor, Development of Hospice and PalliativeCare in the United
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patient or family had decided that further aggressive therapies were
unwanted.263 In some hospital settings, it was only then that serious
attention would be paid to making the patient as comfortable as
possible.2 6
Greater access to palliative care and hospice is becoming
common, although these efforts are in their early stages. Importantly,
the Affordable Care Act explicitly mandates that terminally ill
children be allowed both curative therapies and palliative care.265
These are all steps in the right direction. In fact, this is one of the
areas in which advances in how care is provided at the end of life
should be translated to the delivery of health care generally.
"Palliative care"-which focuses on the prevention and relief of pain
and suffering 266-should lose its association with care at the end of life
and be an important part of all health care.267 A sign that this has
occurred will be when it is no longer called by a special name.
CONCLUSION

The principles described above will not make health care
decisions easier, but that is not their goal. The challenges of health
care decision making-especially those that involve matters of life
and death, pain, suffering, disability, dignity, and family-cannot and
should not be simplified. But in a medical landscape that is constantly
evolving in response to new technologies, treatments, knowledge, or
States, 56 OMEGA 89, 93 (2007).
263. Gawande, supra note 97 (discussing aggressive treatment versus palliative and
hospice care).
264. See id. (discussing care of Sara Monopoli).
265. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2302, 124 Stat.
119, 293 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(o)(1) (2012) (providing that a
decision to accept hospice services for terminally ill children would not constitute a waiver
of the right to payment for curative or treatment services from Medicaid or Children's
Health Insurance Program); see Concurrent Care for Children, NAT'L HOSPICE &
PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., http://www.nhpco.org/resources/concurrent-care-children (last
visited Jan. 27, 2014).
266. See WHO Definition of Palliative Care, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/cancer/palliative/definitionlen/ (last visited Jan. 27. 2014) (defining
palliative care as "an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their
families facing the problem associated with life-threatening illness, through the prevention
and relief of suffering by means of early identification and impeccable assessment and
treatment of pain and other problems, physical, psychosocial and spiritual").
267. NANCY BERLINGER, BRUCE JENNINGS & SUSAN M. WOLF, THE HASTINGS
CENTER GUIDELINES FOR DECISIONS ON LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND CARE
NEAR THE END OF LIFE 116-17 (2d ed. 2013) (recommending the integration of palliative
care "into treatment and care plans in all care settings for all patients, including patients
near the end of life").
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systems of care, these principles can help ensure that we remain
focused on our duties to offer care and respect for every patient and
every family. Special rules for decisions about withholding or
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment may have been useful and even
necessary at some point in the development of the law and ethics in
this area, but their value has diminished and it is time to let them
pass.

